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ARTICLES
THE FUTURE OF EMOTIONAL HARM
Betsy J. Grey*
Why should tort law treat claims for emotional harm as a second-class
citizen? Judicial skepticism about these claims is long entrenched, justified
by an amalgam of perceived problems ranging from proof difficulties for
causation and the need to constrain fraudulent claims, to the ubiquity of the
injury, and a concern about open-ended liability. To address this jumble of
justifications, the law has developed a series of duty limitations to curb the
claims and preclude them from reaching the jury for individualized
analysis. The limited duty approach to emotional harm is maintained by
the latest iteration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
This Article argues that many of the justifications for curtailing this tort
have been discredited by scientific developments. In particular, the rapid
advances in neuroscience give greater insight into the changes that occur in
the brain from emotional harm. Limited duty tests should no longer be used
as proxies for validity or justified by the presumed untrustworthiness of the
claim. Instead, validity evidence for emotional harm claims—like evidence
of physical harm—should be entrusted to juries. This approach will
reassert the jury’s role as the traditional factfinder, promote corrective
justice and deterrence values, and lead to greater equity for negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claimants.
The traditional
limitations on tort recovery, including the rules of evidence and causation,
are more than adequate to avoid opening the floodgates to emotional
distress claims.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2002, four-year-old Daniel Ware, Jr., fell asleep on a school
bus on his way to preschool.1 The driver accidentally left Daniel on the bus
in the school district bus lot.2 When Daniel awoke, he got off the bus and
began walking to the downtown pharmacy where his mother worked.3 A
relative spotted him in a McDonald’s parking lot and returned him to his
mother.4 For the next several months, Daniel was scared about going to
school and sometimes needed a relative to take the bus with him.5 In
March 2003, “Daniel became upset and vomited at school when he was told
that he would be going on a bus field trip the next day.”6 At home, he cried
and begged his mother not to make him go, and he vomited again.7 Three
months later, he was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).8
Daniel’s parents brought suit against the preschool alleging negligent
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) stemming from the bus incident.9
The preschool moved for summary judgment.10 In its motion, the
defendant did not dispute the diagnosis of PTSD or that the PTSD was the
result of the bus incident.11 During the argument for summary judgment,
the defense counsel was willing to concede, for purposes of the motion, that
“this kid did sustain a real mental injury.”12 Instead, the preschool argued

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop., 180 P.3d 610, 612 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612–13.
Id. at 620 (Greene, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).
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that Daniel did not suffer a compensable injury under Kansas law.13 The
trial court granted summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal.14
Why would a court leave a person like Daniel, whose emotional harm
was undisputed, without a legal remedy? In upholding the grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court found that Daniel’s symptoms,
including the vomiting, did not qualify as physical injuries or a physical
impact, as required by Kansas law for NIED claims.15 The court stated that
these requirements are based on “sound legal principle,” in order to
“prevent plaintiffs from recovering for emotional distress that is feigned or
counterfeit . . . . [E]motional distress is a common experience of life and is
usually trivial. Therefore, the courts limit recovery to cases involving
severe emotional distress which is evidenced and substantiated by actual
physical injury.”16
The result in Daniel’s case typifies NIED claims in our civil justice
system. Courts are skeptical of the claims, so they erect barriers to prevent
juries from ever hearing them. This Article urges a different analysis.
Given neuroscientific advances, courts should not fear a case-by-case
examination of the NIED claim, with fact disputes over genuineness going
to the jury. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has generalized that
“claims for emotional injury [are] far less susceptible to objective medical
proof than are their physical counterparts,”17 science is at a turning point in
recognizing, ascertaining, and quantifying emotional pain. The rapid
advances in neuroscience give greater insight into the changes that occur in
the brain from emotional harm. These developments should matter to the
judicial system and warrant individualized analysis of emotional harm
claims. If courts continue barring NIED claims, validity is no longer a
defensible rationale. Other values or moral judgments would need to justify
the unique skepticism of these claims.18
The traditional—and current—view does not treat emotional harm
and physical harm in parity.19 The Restatement (Third) of Torts treats
emotional harms separately from physical harms, demanding a showing of
“serious” emotional harm before the claim can proceed.20 It distinguishes
bodily harm from emotional harm noting that “[u]sually the existence of
bodily harm can be verified objectively while the existence and severity of

13. Id. at 612 (majority opinion).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 613–14.
16. Id. at 617 (quoting Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 954 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
17. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 434 (1997) (quoting
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994)).
18. See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the
American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 211 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011).
19. Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015)
(calling for treating physical and emotional harm in parity: “bodification of harm doctrine
underlies the federal and most state systems of torts”).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012).
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emotional harm is ordinarily dependent on self-reporting.”21 While courts
continue to observe this distinction, other areas have changed course.
Neuroscience has made significant advances in quantifying mental injury.22
In the medical arena, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM-5) has
arrived with a broadened view of psychiatric illness,23 and our normative
views of emotional harm have changed as well.24
Judicial skepticism about the NIED claim is long entrenched. Part I
briefly reviews the complicated and rather illogical history of the
development of emotional harm tort claims in the United States. This
skepticism has been explained by an amalgam of reasons, including the lack
of medical expertise, inherent proof difficulties for causation, the need to
curtail fraudulent claims, the ubiquity of the injury, and the overriding
concern of open-ended liability.25 Given this parade of concerns, courts do
not apply ordinary negligence principles to NIED claims. Instead, the law
has developed a series of limiting duty tests to curtail the claim and
determine whether it “merit[s] inclusion among the exceptions to the
general rule of no liability.”26 These tests aim to prevent individualized
analysis and to limit aggregate liability.27
Can these tests be justified by the underlying theories of tort law? That is
the subject of Part II, which examines NIED claims in light of rights-based
and instrumentalist theories of tort law. From a rights-based point of view,
tort law promotes the natural right to be free from injury as a result of the
actions of others. Under this view, victims of emotional harm are as
deserving as victims of physical harm. But rights do not necessarily have a
counterpart in remedies, particularly in the NIED area. Instrumentalist
concerns predominate. The fear of ripple effects of recognizing a remedy
for emotional injury coincides with the value judgment that operates
throughout tort jurisprudence:
namely, that physical harms are more
important and deserving of compensation than emotional harms.28 Courts
and legislatures always have been hesitant about compensating for losses
that cannot readily be measured in dollars.29 There is also the concern that
increased liability will inhibit productive activities for an arguably nebulous
benefit.30 Thus, the balance of individual and social interests is struck

21. Id. § 45 cmt. a.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. a.
26. Id. § 47 cmt. i (discussing the relationship between one of the limiting tests and the
general foreseeability test used in negligence).
27. See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 806 (2004).
28. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1668 (2002) (“[C]ourts have long given ‘second class’ citizenship to emotional
distress . . . as harms or protected interests.”).
29. See John Diamond, Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress: A Critique of the
Restatement (Third) §§ 45–47, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 153 (2008).
30. Id. at 153–54.
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differently for negligently inflicted physical harm and negligently inflicted
emotional harm.31
In striking this balance, the definition of harm has become the central
issue for NIED claims. Part III offers three different perspectives from
which to examine emotional harm—scientific, medical, and normative—
and demonstrates how developments in those areas have changed our
understanding of emotional harm claims. The argument that emotional
injury is untrustworthy or cannot be adequately proved is losing its force.
Technological developments, especially advances in neuroscience, soon
may be able to provide reliable quantification evidence for emotional
injury.32 If we choose not to treat emotional harm as equivalent to physical
harms in tort law despite these advances, we will be forced to confront the
reasons for the distinction more directly. If we could eliminate factual
concerns regarding validity and reliability, on what basis can we distinguish
NIED claims for unequal treatment?
Part IV argues that the time is ripe to remove limited duty barriers based
on validity concerns in the NIED area. Validity evidence for NIED claims,
like evidence of physical harm, should be entrusted to juries. This approach
should alleviate the concern of using limited duty analysis to advance
outdated or unjustified policy goals and lead to greater equity for NIED
claimants. Other instrumentalist concerns over NIED claims, such as
unlimited liability, can be addressed in other ways, such as traditional duty
and proximate cause analyses.
Accordingly, in Part IV, this Article proposes that we should recast legal
barriers that stem from questions of validity in emotional harm cases and
test those questions through traditional evidentiary admissibility rules,
allowing the fact-finder’s individualized analysis of the harm. Under this
approach, courts should not require special pleadings or reject a claim of
emotional harm as a matter of law based on validity concerns but instead
scrutinize the evidence through traditional evidentiary rules, including
Daubert33 testing. Assuming the evidence is admissible, the jury will fulfill
its traditional role of individually assessing the validity of the injury on a
case-by-case basis. This approach would reassert the jury’s role as the
traditional fact-finder and promote corrective justice and deterrence values,
which have been overtaken by instrumentalist concerns. Individuals like
Daniel will not be deprived of a hearing because of outdated assumptions
about failure of proof.
31. See id. at 177 (“The current approach to negligent infliction of mental distress
appears to treat it as a wayward stepchild to be tolerated out of historical, if not family
loyalty, but constrained, where not entrenched, to avoid further embarrassment.”); see also
Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
751, 752 (2001) (“In the hierarchy of torts, emotional and relational harms are not as fully
protected as physical injury and property damage.”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at
1672 (“The law in this area can do no better than announce restrictions on liability whose
only justification is: ‘We can’t do any better than this.’”).
32. Neuroscience has begun to show that emotional harm can be physically and
objectively verified. See infra Part III.A.
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
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I. A BRIEF BUT COMPLICATED HISTORY OF EMOTIONAL HARM CLAIMS
The story of the development of the common law claim for emotional
distress resulting from negligent behavior has been told many times, with
various explanations for why the tort has never achieved the same status as
physical or property harms in American tort law. The claim started with a
presumption of no duty and gradually evolved into a subset of negligence
law that allows some sharply circumscribed recovery in certain limited
situations, creating a patchwork of seemingly inconsistent liability rules.
This patchwork of rules developed in part because of the different
avenues along which emotional harm traveled in American jurisprudence.
Emotional harm has long-standing recognition as a compensable injury as a
parasitic harm to personal injury or property damage claims, usually
referred to as a claim for pain and suffering.34 Common law also
traditionally recognized emotional harm claims as a component of
trespassory torts like assault, false imprisonment, and defamation, allowing
a presumption of damages without a showing of related physical injury.35
If emotional harm is proven in these cases, damages are recoverable as
attached to some other tort, not as a stand-alone claim of emotional distress.
The stand-alone or “pure” claim of emotional distress developed
separately, along two tracks—one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED) and the other, a later outgrowth of IIED, of emotional
distress resulting from negligent behavior (NIED). These stand-alone
claims do not require that the plaintiff show that the defendant committed a
separate tort or inflicted physical harm. Instead, the claim exists on its
own.36
To satisfy the scienter requirement for IIED, the plaintiff must show that
the conduct involved was extreme and outrageous, as well as demonstrate
that the actor purposefully caused the severe emotional harm.37 The
Restatement (Third) defines the extreme and outrageous requirement as
“conduct [that] goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it

34. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 772, 814 (1985) (“Initially, most jurisdictions required a concurrent physical injury or
condition.”).
35. See Willard H. Pedrick, Intentional Infliction: Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985); see also Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 659 (Ky. 2000)
(noting “showing of actual damages is not an element of battery” (citation omitted)).
36. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968). As the Restatement (Third)
explains with regard to IIED, “the outrage tort [IIED] originated as a catchall to permit
recovery in the narrow instance when an actor’s conduct exceeded all permissible bounds of
a civilized society but an existing tort claim was unavailable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. a (2012).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46. The American Law Institute recognized an independent tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress in the Restatement of Torts in 1948. See generally David Crump, Evaluating
Independent Torts Based upon “Intentional” or “Negligent” Infliction of Emotional
Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
439 (1992) (describing the history of IIED).
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would be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.”38 The focus is
on the extreme conduct, and courts largely presume that emotional harm
will follow.39 As a result, the plaintiff is generally not required to use
medical testimony to show either the severity of the distress or its cause.40
Although the claim of NIED, the second type of stand-alone emotional
harm claim, developed as an outgrowth of IIED, it focuses squarely on the
harm suffered rather than the extremity of the defendant’s conduct.41
Courts moved cautiously in the development of the stand-alone claim of
NIED, creating exceptions to the general rule of no duty through a series of
small steps, including: (1) dropping the requirement of a preceding
physical injury in favor of a requirement of “physical impact;”42
(2) expanding beyond the “impact” test to allow claims arising within a
“zone of danger,” where the defendant’s negligence placed the plaintiff in
danger of physical harm;43 (3) requiring physical manifestations of
objective symptoms;44 (4) demanding a showing of a “serious” injury45 or a
medically diagnosable one;46 and (5) imposing some combination of these
requirements.47 Although these requirements have been criticized as

38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 46 cmt. d.
39. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952)
(“Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found in the defendant’s conduct designed
to bring it about than in physical injury that may or may not have resulted therefrom.”);
Kenneth B. Baren, Bystander Emotional Distress: Should Third Parties Recover Regardless
of the Negligent Tort?, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 353 (2004) (noting that the focus in IIED
claims traditionally is on the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct, not the physical
impact or physical manifestation of the claim); Diamond, supra note 29, at 143; Rhee, supra
note 27, at 864 (explaining that in IIED, “culpability is the prime focus”). But see Rogers v.
Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 209–10 (Tenn. 2012) (requiring severity showing for
both IIED and NIED claims).
40. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 303 (2000).
41. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 864–65.
42. Some states retain the impact requirement. See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,
533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2000); Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989 (Ind. 2006); Steel
Tech. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. 2007).
43. See, e.g., AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1998). The “zone of
danger” rule later gave rise to the “bystander” rule, under which a bystander can recover for
emotional harm for contemporaneously witnessing bodily harm to a close relative. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. a.
44. Some states retain this requirement as well. See Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730
A.2d 1086 (Vt. 1999). However, other states have abolished this requirement. See, e.g.,
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). Still, others have diluted it. See,
e.g., Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007) (requiring medically
diagnosable disorder).
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM,
§ 47 cmt. d.
46. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C.
1990).
47. See, e.g., Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2007) (holding
that the plaintiff may show either impact or physical manifestation of emotional harm); see
also Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (describing the ways these “verification requirement[s]”
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1633 (“courts
employ, or have employed, a tangled array of concepts such as ‘predicate injury,’ ‘parasitic
damage,’ ‘impact,’ ‘zone of danger,’ ‘foreseeability,’ ‘direct/indirect,’ and ‘bystander.’”).
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arbitrary,48 the broader foreseeability of harm test, the traditional basis for
negligence, has not been accepted as basis for liability except by a few
jurisdictions.49 Instead, the no duty or limited duty rules are designed to
preclude a case-by-case analysis.50 If a claimant can get beyond the duty
barriers, courts generally apply an objective test for proof of harm—that a
reasonable person would suffer severe emotional harm under the
circumstances, as well as a subjective test, that the plaintiff in fact suffered
severe emotional harm.51
The development of the NIED claim is confusing and perhaps illogical,52
but the claim continues to evolve and change, with limited modifications of
the barriers.53 The most recent section of the Restatement (Third)
addressing NIED claims,54 which states have begun to adopt,55 currently
48. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 399 (1984) (arguing that mental injuries should be treated the
same as physical injuries in tort); Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to
Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW & INEQ. 391, 486–87 (1996) (arguing that NIED
discriminates against women and should be treated the same as general tort law); Richard S.
Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making “The
Punishment Fit the Crime,” 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979) (suggesting duty should be
owed to all foreseeable plaintiffs, but damages should be limited to economic loss); Rhee,
supra note 27, at 883 (stating current NIED doctrine is inherently arbitrary and proposing a
complete overhaul of the law).
49. See, e.g., Montinieri v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978)
(upholding jury charge based on foreseeability of the emotional distress resulting in bodily
harm); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 762–64 (Haw. 1974) (striking down requirements
of physical impact and physical manifestation as “artificial bars” to recovery; shifting to
general foreseeability test for bystander NIED); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw.
1970) (striking down physical manifestation requirement for NIED); Gammon v.
Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987) (allowing jury to determine
validity of the claim despite the plaintiff showing no physical manifestations of emotional
injury, suffering no physical impact, and in the absence of any underlying or accompanying
tort).
50. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 809.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. l (2012).
52. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 846 (stating that the common law barriers to the NIED
claim can be “understood as crude attempts to force mental injury claims into the analytical
framework of physical injury claims.”); id. at 883 (“Courts and scholars know that the
current rules of law are arbitrary, and that is the problem.”).
53. Commentators and courts have suggested various ways to modify the common law
tests to make them less arbitrary or more effectively serve the policy concern of limiting
liability. See Miller, supra note 48, at 38–39 (arguing for capping actual damages or limiting
recovery to economic losses); Rhee, supra note 27, at 846 (suggesting that courts could have
imposed a higher evidentiary burden like the clear and convincing standard); Herbert
Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 285 (1944) (advocating for the categorical rejection of all
emotional injury claims).
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47.
55. See, e.g., Vumbaca v. Terminal One Grp. Ass’n L.P., 859 F. Supp. 2d 343, 373
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (barring recovery where emotional injury is not “serious” or suffered under
“severe” circumstances, in a suit against an airliner for being locked in a grounded plane for
seven hours); Cohen v. NuVasive, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 868 n.15 (2008) (permitting
recovery where the defendant mishandled human remains); Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker
Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 800 (D.C. 2011) (permitting recovery where serious emotional harm is
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has broken down the NIED claim into two main types. It provides that
“[a]n actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to
another” is liable if: (a) the negligence places the plaintiff “in danger of
immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the danger;” or
(b) the negligent conduct “occurs in the course of specified categories of
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is
especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”56
The first type of NIED claim traces back to the traditional requirements
of “impact” and “zone of danger,” in which the conduct of the negligent
actor places the plaintiff in danger of bodily harm and the plaintiff suffers
emotional harm as a result.57
The second type of claim, which some courts classify as an independent
duty, involves emotional harm arising in the context of certain limited
relationships, undertakings, or activities, drawing on the traditional line of
cases involving hospitals and funeral homes mishandling corpses or
negligently misinforming someone about the death of a loved one.58 More
recently, courts have begun to use this category to award damages in cases
involving consumption of a food that contains a repulsive foreign object,59
cases in which a physician negligently diagnoses a patient with a serious
disease, or cases in which a hospital misplaces a newborn.60 This category
is narrowly cabined, in order to address the concern of indeterminate and
“especially likely” in HIV-misdiagnosis suit against medical clinic, given nature of the
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff); Miranda v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8, 28 (Iowa 2013)
(permitting recovery where negligent conduct in attorney-client relationship in the
immigration context was “especially likely to cause serious emotional harm”); Osborne v.
Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Ky. 2012) (rejecting impact test and adopting “serious” or
“severe” emotional injury test for emotional harm when a plane crashed into the plaintiff’s
home); Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010) (holding
claimant does “not need to observe or perceive the negligent conduct, or demonstrate any
physical manifestation of emotional distress” in deciding certified question on negligent
mishandling of deceased family member’s remains); Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184,
192 (Tex. 2013) (finding no recovery for negligent euthanasia of plaintiffs’ dog); Vincent v.
DeVries, 72 A.3d 886, 897 (Vt. 2013) (holding that emotional distress damages are not
available to client in legal malpractice suit where nature of emotional harm not sufficiently
“serious”).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47. Some examples of the kinds of activities, undertakings, or relationships that might
give rise to liability include the mishandling of dead bodies or the erroneous delivery of the
news that someone has died. Id. § 47 cmt. f; cf. Rhee, supra note 27, at 854 (arguing for two
classes of victims for NIED claims, the direct victim class and the collateral victim class,
with the direct victim class including situations where the defendant and the plaintiff have a
preexisting relationship).
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. b.
58. Id. § 47 cmt. f.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1990) (independent duty
for emotional distress in context of a medical malpractice action); Johnson v. Ruark
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85, 93 (N.C. 1990) (same); Fox & Stein, supra
note 19 (manuscript at 13) (“In exceptional cases, actors assume a duty to avoid emotional
harm when they have a special relationship with the victim,” citing medical care from
psychiatrists and fertility clinics as examples).
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excessive liability.61 “Typically, the undertaking or relationship is one in
which serious emotional harm is likely or where one person is in a position
of power or authority over the other and therefore has greater potential to
inflict emotional harm.”62 These undertakings are likely to cause serious
emotional distress if negligently performed.63 Courts have not provided
clear guidelines on how to identify which activities, undertakings, or
relationships give rise to this duty,64 although several commentators have
offered ways to define such a duty.65
Outside of these two areas, the Restatement (Third) does not encourage
actions for NIED. In particular, the Restatement (Third) discourages
actions for fear of future injury arising from toxic exposure.66 The
cancerphobia cases present a concern of multiple lawsuits—one brought at
It
exposure and the other brought when bodily injury occurs.67
distinguishes cancerphobia cases from the HIV exposure cases, however,
because the HIV exposure cases have a relatively confined period during
which the exposed individual would suffer from emotional harm and is
more akin to automobile accidents.68 Several commentators find this
distinction ironic because the cancerphobia claim is arguably the more
significant one.69
While the NIED claim for direct victims developed, courts also gradually
began to allow a bystander who witnessed an accident and suffered
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. d.
62. Id. § 47 cmt. f.
63. See generally Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789 (D.C. 2011)
(citing cases from various jurisdictions). Some courts have rejected this idea, however. See,
e.g., Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. 2011) (stating that to recover under a
NIED claim, the plaintiff must either suffer an impact or satisfy the bystander rules).
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. f.
65. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Undertakings and Special Relationships in Claims for
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (2008) (arguing that the
independent duty should be commensurate to the extent of the undertaking); Jeffrey A.
Ehrich, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Case for an Independent Duty Rule in
Minnesota, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1402 (2011) (proposing an independent duty rule
examining factors such as historical industry acceptance of a duty, the subject matter of the
harm involved, and countervailing policy considerations).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. k.
67. Id.
68. Id. (explaining that in HIV exposure cases, a “person can determine within a known
and relatively short interval whether or not the exposure actually did cause the physical
injury,” like an automobile accident).
69. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 29, at 164 (explaining that the anomaly of
compensating for lesser but not greater injuries can be explained by the concern that
“compensating for short-term distress is not economically burdensome while compensating
for long-term distress would be”); Robert L. Rabin, Harms from Exposure to Toxic
Substances: The Limits of Liability Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 419, 425 (2011) (“[R]espectable
argument can be made that it is perverse to recognize the tort claim of an individual
traumatized by almost being hit by a negligent driver (a fleeting moment of terror?), but to
deny recovery to an individual living with a long-term prospect of contracting cancer due to
a defendant’s wrongful conduct.”).
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emotional harm as a result to recover in certain limited settings.
“Bystander” NIED cases also developed a series of limited duty barriers.
Dillon v. Legg70 became the leading case recognizing bystander liability,
articulating certain factors required before recovery could go forward.71
The Restatement (Third) has adopted a version of the Dillon rule, requiring
the bystander to contemporaneously observe sudden serious bodily harm to
a close family member before being allowed to recover for emotional
harm.72
This brief chronicle omits a great deal of historical description.
However, the main point is that the courts began with the general rule that
an actor is not liable for negligent conduct that causes only emotional harm.
Then, as they began to recognize exceptions to the general rule in certain
limited settings, courts set up a series of barriers to the stand-alone claim of
emotional injury on an ad hoc basis. Courts generally recited a number of
concerns—based on proof problems and the widespread nature of the
injury—to justify the barriers.
This type of claim screening through limited duty rules may not
sufficiently take into account modern developments in the understanding,
diagnosis, and verification of mental illness. In particular, as we gain
greater ability to empirically measure emotional harm claims, we should
shift to using traditional evidentiary screening for fact-based validity
evidence rather than relying on special pleading rules and limited duty
barriers, allowing the fact-finder to decide the question. Separating out our
validity concerns will force us to judge whether limiting tests are justified
for other reasons, theoretical or policy-based, which require us to go back to
first principles.
II. THE UNDERLYING THEORIES OF TORT LAW IN NIED
This part examines the theories behind negligence-based torts, and NIED
claims in particular, to explore whether we can carve out verification
questions in NIED claims from other substantive concerns. Separating
these concerns would allow the traditional fact-finder to determine factual
validity questions—subject to traditional evidentiary limitations—instead of
having the judge make factual findings on validity in the context of
applying limited duty rules.

70. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
71. The court named three factors to be used in determining the degree of foreseeability:
(1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the accident; (2) whether the plaintiff directly observed the
accident; and (3) whether the plaintiff had a close relationship with the victim. Id. at 920.
Before Dillon, courts allowed recovery for witnessing bodily harm to another only if the
person was subjected to physical impact from the defendant’s negligent conduct or was
personally in the “zone of danger” from the defendant’s negligent conduct. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. a.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 48. This claim is considered derivative of the physically injured person’s tort claim against
the tortfeasor, so that the plaintiff must prove that the physically injured person could
recover from the tortfeasor. Id. § 48 cmt. d.
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Identifying the rationale behind tort law is a complex enterprise. Two
main theories have dominated the jurisprudence over the last several
decades: a rights-based theory and an instrumentalist theory.73 Some
scholars argue that tort law is rights-based—that is, that torts should
redress, or provide recourse for, wrongs. This approach looks backward to
the relationship between the victim and the injurer. Other scholars see torts
as more instrumental—that is, torts should be used to prevent wrongs or
shift injury costs away from those who have suffered loss. This approach
looks beyond the relationship between the injurer and the victim to examine
the effect that imposing liability will have on others.74 These two views
have offered a unified, or monist, theory of how tort cases have been
decided historically.75 Yet, many scholars of tort law find monist theories
to be overly restrictive and incomplete, embracing instead a more pluralistic
conception of tort law.76
In examining these main theories, we must begin with the two major
functions of tort law that are generally accepted: corrective justice and
deterrence.77 A rights-based theory of tort law draws from the first major
function, corrective justice. It calls on tort law to distribute responsibility
according to the injustice that results from the tortfeasor’s conduct and
serves to correct the moral imbalance that results when one party wrongs

73. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 468 (2006) (“[S]ince the 1970s it has been standard
in academic discussions of tort . . . to divide the world of tort theory into justice-based
theories on the one hand and welfarist or utilitarian theories on the other.”).
74. See W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty to
Warn Third Parties, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 887 (2009) (“[I]nstrumentalist theories
view tort law as the state’s means of achieving certain goals external to the dispute between
the parties—the dominant theory being economic instrumentalism with the goal of reducing
injuries to their most efficient level.”).
75. See id.
76. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Confused Culpability, Contrived
Causation and the Collapse of Tort Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 406 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (noting that tort law consists of a “motley collection of
doctrines” that are difficult to justify under normative principles); Jason M. Solomon, Equal
Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (2009) (describing how
many scholars fall back to pluralistic account of tort law).
77. Numerous other functions of tort law are also used to justify tort liability, in
particular the functions of loss distribution and compensation. See Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961). The loss
distribution view recognizes that defendants frequently do not shoulder the burden of
compensation themselves, but rather pass it on to a larger number of individuals. Id. Loss
distribution is used to justify rules of liability that impose liability on businesses and
institutions that can redistribute their losses to insurance or customers. Id. Although some
authors suggest that compensation is a goal of tort law, others characterize it more as an
effect of imposing tort liability. Under this view, awarding compensation is a way to serve
other goals of tort law, like deterrence and corrective justice. In other words, compensation
is not awarded simply because an individual suffered injuries resulting from a defendant’s
activity; other factors explain the imposition of liability and consequent requirement of
payment of monetary damages. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 91
(1963) (“The undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground that they resulted from
the defendant’s act would not only be open to [other] objections but . . . to the still graver
one of offending the sense of justice.”).
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another.78 “[C]orrective justice narrowly focuses on the question of what is
just between the parties, rather than on the implications that a decision in
one case might have for society as a whole . . . .”79
Some scholars from the rights-based school focus less on ensuring that an
injustice is corrected and more on providing victims with recourse for civil
wrongs.80 This civil recourse approach views as paramount the victims’
need for recognition that they have been wronged.81 Under this view,
payment of damages should be proportional to the seriousness of the injury
and the seriousness of the wrong. The civil recourse view does not deny
that emotional distress is a harm or view it as a less serious form of harm
than physical injury; instead it “assert[s] that actors are not ordinarily under
a legal duty to be vigilant of others’ emotional well-being.”82
The second generally accepted major function of tort law, deterrence,
draws from instrumentalist concerns and tries to prevent future injurious
behavior by threatening liability for tortious actions.83 This view looks
beyond the relationship between the injurer and the victim to reducing the
overall social consequences of risky activity.84 Some risks (and the
consequent losses that may ensue) are not worth avoiding from a societal
perspective. For example, there are social benefits to having people drive,
even though driving is a risky activity; we seek to promote optimal
deterrence by deterring unnecessarily risky driving.
In seeking optimal deterrence, some supporters of the theory use an
economic lens to determine quantitatively which risks are worth deterring
and which are not. They compare the monetary costs of risking certain
losses with the monetary costs of preventing those losses. “[T]his idea
emphasizes the impact of legal rules on incentives, and in injury law it often
utilizes a comparison of costs and benefits.”85 This strict economic
78. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (elucidating
account of corrective justice as unifying structure in tort law); Cardi, supra note 74, at 887
(“Corrective justice generally posits that the tort system is exclusively about establishing
justice through examining the relationship between the parties to the action, balancing their
respective rights and obligations under the circumstances, and resolving their individualized
dispute justly.”); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67
IND. L.J. 349, 353 (1992) (explaining that losses can be wrongful if they invade a legally
protected right); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570
(2003) (“Tort law, on this view, aims both to specify the primary duties actors owe to one
another and to provide a vehicle by which the secondary duty to repair is enforced.”).
79. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 217 (2012) (tracing the
corrective justice approach from the writings of Aristotle).
80. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO.
L.J. 695 (2003).
81. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1672–73 (“[T]he right question to ask is:
‘Has the plaintiff been wronged such that she is now entitled to seek recourse?’”).
82. Id. at 1673.
83. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 181 (2012)
(“The civil justice system deters misconduct.”).
84. Id. (“Civil judgments, settlements, the potential for litigation—the tort system
itself—has a beneficial effect on the behavior of those who are the subject of legal action as
well as others in the same or similar lines of commerce.”).
85. SHAPO, supra note 79, at 229 (noting that this analysis often focuses on the “least
cost avoider,” or the party that can most cheaply avoid an injury).
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approach is sometimes criticized for ignoring other social costs, including
important human values that may not have a monetary value attached to
them.86
The jurisprudence of the NIED tort represents a mixture of corrective
justice and instrumentalist reasoning, with a heavier emphasis on the latter.
Although courts frequently focus on the relationship between the parties
and draw upon community notions of harm, both critical to the theory of
corrective justice, many theorists and courts emphasize the instrumentalist
concerns, looking to factors such as overdeterrence in justifying limits on
the NIED tort. Moreover, despite the courts’ recitation of these factors,
they sometimes muddy the concerns and seem to be relying on mere
intuition.87 A more thorough examination reveals the need for a clearer, if
theoretically pluralistic, understanding of duty in this context.
A. Corrective Justice Concerns
Rights-based theories of tort law recognize that victims have certain
rights that, when violated, demand compensation from the injurer. The
nature and extent of a victim’s harm is determined by looking to the
victim’s rights and evaluating the relationship between the victim and the
injurer to determine if the victim’s rights were violated under the
circumstances.
There are numerous ways to conceptualize a victim’s rights under
corrective justice theory.88 Under basic principles of corrective justice, as
outlined by Aristotle, the right to equality is the governing factor.89 The
right to self-preservation is another right that is recognized, and can be
conceptualized as deriving from a fundamental right to exist free of harm
from wrongful conduct.90 It also has been explained in terms of Locke’s

86. See Michael D. Green, Negligence=Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1605, 1640 (1997) (“How much is a broken arm, a shattered brain, or a life
worth? . . . [M]ost people react to comparisons of lives and limbs with the dollars it would
cost to save them as jarring, inappropriate, or even absurd.”).
87. See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 817 (2015) (finding
emotional harm cases in tort law “have generated doctrine that perhaps embodies our
intuitions”).
88. See Zipursky, supra note 80, at 700 n.18 (listing various schools of corrective
justice).
89. Alan Calnan, The Instrumental Justice of Private Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 559, 579
(2010) (“Justice’s private dimension, which addresses the unique dynamics of interpersonal
transactions, is embodied in the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice. Corrective justice
seeks to restore moral equilibrium to human relations that become imbalanced by wrongful
conduct . . . by forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge her gain and extinguish the victim’s
loss.”). In order to determine the proper remedy, a neutral party (the judge) first determines
the position of equality of the parties before the injury occurred. Next, the judge determines
if the injury caused any unjust gain or loss. Finally, to restore the parties to a position of
equality, any unjust gain is returned to the victim, and any unjust loss is compensated. Id.;
see Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 257–59 (2000).
90. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 855–57 (2004).
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social contract theory.91 Still another rights-based theory sees a victim’s
right as a right to a remedy.92
John Rawls’s theory of social justice offers another way to conceptualize
victim’s rights.93 Under this theory, every person is entitled to justice as
fairness, or, put differently, every individual should be given an equal
ability to pursue his or her conception of what is good.94 Since physical
and mental well-being are necessary to participate completely in and enjoy
the human experience, any trespass that causes physical or mental harm
interferes with the victim’s right to equal opportunities in life.95
Under all of these interpretations of rights-based theory, a victim should
be able to recover for injuries of any sort, both physical and emotional, if
the victim’s right has been violated.96 But, this is not the case. Tort law
has traditionally deemphasized rights-based concerns in the NIED context.
One reason is because courts believe they are limited in being able to
recognize or quantify effectively emotional harm, and therefore they are
less willing to emphasize corrective justice concerns. They are less certain
that the claims have merit.97
Consequently, courts measure the values of corrective justice differently
in the NIED context than in other tort contexts. Although all line drawing
91. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 542–44 (2005). In
Locke’s state of nature, each individual possessed the right to self-preservation, along with
the right to redress injuries caused by the trespass of others. The right to redress injuries
encompassed both an individual right to reparation and a more general right to punish
trespass on behalf of all society. Once the social contract was formed, government was
granted the right to punish trespass or refuse remedy for trespass against the whole society.
However, each member of society retained the individual right to reparation for trespasses
against them. Thus, under this theory, a victim is entitled to seek compensation for any
trespass that threatens his or her right to self-preservation. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 11 (1690).
92. See generally Eric Encarnacion, Corrective Justice As Making Amends, 62 BUFF. L.
REV. 451 (2014). Under this view, the wrongdoer has a duty to make amends to the victim,
but it does not equate to the traditional duty to make restitution or make the victim whole.
See W. Jonathan Cardi, Damages As Reconciliation, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5, 18 (2008)
(“[C]ourts can and should embrace reconciliation as one of the law’s central goals in
litigation, particularly in tort cases.”). Instead, the wrongdoer is only required to make
reasonable, adequate conciliatory gestures. Id. at 15 (“[O]ffering of reparations by the
wrongdoer is a strong sign that apology, remorse, and the desire to reconcile are real and not
manufactured. Without assurances that the offender is genuine, few victims are willing to
walk the path of reconciliation.”).
93. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
94. Id. at 10–11.
95. See Bell, supra note 48, at 342 (stating that under this view, “[p]sychic well-being is
the core of what is important to human existence and is too important to the individual to
surrender”).
96. See Gregory C. Keating, When Is Emotional Distress Harm?, in TORT LAW:
CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 273, 305 (Stephen G.K. Pitel et al. eds., 2013) (“[P]sychological
integrity is as essential to effective agency as physical integrity is.”); Rhee, supra note 27, at
852 (“Ideally, every person should have a right to be free from the imposition of wrongful
conduct that would cause injuries.”).
97. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 622
(2011) (noting that limited duty tests stood as “inaccurate proxies for the measurement of the
intensity of a plaintiff’s emotional distress”).
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used in common law torts reflects the inherent tension between exercising
the freedom to act and the need to conform to societal constraints, in the
emotional harm area, courts rely more heavily on the degree of culpability
involved; the more egregious the behavior, the more likely the harm will be
recognized. For example, as described above, the initial recognition of a
claim for recovery of emotional injury grew out of the intentional tort
context. This tort does not require a specific showing of harm; injury is
presumed. It appears that the paramount value promoted by IIED is the
interest in regulating conduct, with a lesser concern about the actual injury
suffered or the need to provide compensation.98 In other words, the social
interest in ensuring conformity is stronger than the individual interest in
receiving recognition for a wrong suffered.99
The balance struck between these values shifted as recognition of the tort
expanded from the intentional to the negligence area. As the degree of
culpability shifted down, moving from intentional, to gross, and finally to
negligent behavior, so did the social interest in regulating behavior. But the
interest in recognizing a harm suffered did not grow commensurately; the
value of freedom of action takes on greater significance under this view.100
This approach helps keep NIED claims to a minimum and allows courts to
reserve valuable and limited resources for less speculative (and more
important) physical harm claims.
Only the historical exceptions, in which courts did not require a showing
of injury in certain specific contexts (the negligent handling of a corpse and
the negligently delivered death announcement), shifted the emphasis to
more corrective justice concerns. This may reflect a consensus about the
likely validity of the harm and strong public interest in protecting the
sanctity of death, including burial and misinformation regarding death, or it
may reflect a consensus about the nature of certain relationships in which
one party requires extra protection.101
B. Instrumentalist Concerns
Instrumentalist concerns dominate the NIED field. As described above,
courts historically expressed general disapproval of emotional harm as a
compensable injury, originally finding no duty and then gradually setting up
98. See Brian L. Church, Balancing Corrective Justice and Deterrence: Injury
Requirements and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 60 ALA. L. REV. 697, 704
(2009).
99. See Crump, supra note 37, at 448–49. That is not to say, however, that all
intentional conduct that causes emotional harm has little social value. Id. (citing examples
like a “fire-and-brimstone preacher” and a lawyer cross-examining a witness to suggest
instances of socially desirable activities that inflict emotional distress).
100. This general view also creates more subtle value-laden judgments that have a
disparate impact on certain classes of claimants. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990)
(claims by women); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1669; Rhee, supra note 27, at
844 (same-sex marriage).
101. At least one author has categorized these actions as intentional torts. John J. Kircher,
The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 796
(2007).
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a series of unique limiting tests in the form of special pleading
requirements.102 Various explanations that reflect instrumentalist concerns
are offered for this disparate treatment. However, at bottom, the
instrumental concern of optimal deterrence is calculated differently than for
other negligence claims. The underlying message behind the limitations is
that these claims are of lesser importance in the tort system than personal
injury or property harms.103 Undervaluing loss from emotional harm
lowers the value of deterrence in this area.
This concern is often expressed as a fear of opening up the proverbial
floodgates of litigation. Initially, this concern served as an absolute barrier
to the claim.104 Small inroads were made in certain limited situations—the
mishandling of a corpse and the erroneous announcement of a death of a
family member105—special recognition that exists to this day.106 From an
instrumentalist standpoint, these exceptions may reflect the assurance of
both the genuineness as well as the infrequency of the claim.107
Other inroads occurred that were fashioned to meet instrumentalist
concerns of uncontrolled liability exposure. Imposing the spatial restriction
to victims of emotional distress within the “zone of danger” of serious
physical injury reflects the same commitment to avoid opening of the
floodgates of litigation. This means that victims of “near-misses” of airline
or car crashes are eligible to recover for emotional distress108 but that
“cancerphobia” cases may not afford the opportunity for recovery for
emotional distress. In the latter cases, in which an individual has been
exposed to some toxins that may have long-term health consequences, the
zone of danger requirement has been retained as a barrier to NIED
claims.109
Cancerphobia cases also demonstrate a related instrumentalist concern
involving the need to prioritize claims to avoid depletion of a defendant’s
resources that other (“more deserving”) claimants may later pursue. This
view has been highlighted in the asbestos litigation. As the Supreme Court

102. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
103. See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms
of Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1935 (2002) (explaining the need for prioritization;
if a more expansive duty for emotional harm would significantly decrease the possibility for
full compensation for physically injured claimants, then emotional harm duty must be
limited); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 825 n.78 (listing scholars who question tort law’s lesser
protection afforded emotional harm over physical injury).
104. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled by Battalla v.
State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
105. See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of Constraint, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2009).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012);
DOBBS, supra note 40, § 308, at 836–37.
107. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1199.
108. See, e.g., Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (discussing how the airplane plunged 34,000 feet before gaining control); Falzone v.
Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965) (discussing evolution of near miss doctrine); Rabin, supra
note 105, at 1199, 1208.
109. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1200.
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wrote in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,110 “[i]n a world
of limited resources, would a rule permitting immediate large-scale
recoveries for widespread emotional distress caused by fear of future
disease diminish the likelihood of recovery by those who later suffer from
the disease?”111 When the claims of those who suffer anxiety about what
ultimately may happen to them are pitted against those whose fears actually
come to fruition, the courts signaled that the “more deserving” victims were
those who suffered the most serious physical consequences.112
Related to the need to prioritize claims is the concern of the award’s
disproportionality to the tort involved. Here, court decisions seek to ensure
fairness to the injurer by invoking the principle that “the punishment should
fit the crime.”113 Although the move from no duty to the limited duty of
NIED suggests that courts now recognize greater social interest in
regulating conduct that affects emotional well-being, the rules are designed
to ensure that certain conduct affecting emotional well-being is not (over)
deterred. Optimal deterrence has a different equation in this context. From
this point of view, the concern is not the legitimacy of the claim; it’s that
there will be too many claims. The limiting tests are designed to ensure that
defendants and the other entities to which they passed on costs are not
overly burdened with NIED claims.114 Thus, the Supreme Court justified
the line that it drew between physical and mental harms in Buckley by
explaining that it allows a “tort system that can distinguish between reliable
and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial
claims on the other.”115
As our understanding of and ability to measure empirically emotional
harm changes, so should our emphasis on the values we promote. The
instrumentalist perspective is motivated partly by a set of concerns that
advances in neuroscience can allay. We may not need to prioritize physical
damage claims over emotional harm claims, as we learn that emotional
harm has a physical correlate. As the sharp distinction between the two can
110. 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (examining NIED claims under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act for exposure to asbestos without symptoms).
111. Id. at 435–36.
112. Rabin, supra note 105, at 1200; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go
First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 560–62
(1992). The asbestos litigation has also developed an intermediate situation in which the
claimant suffers some intermediate injury, like asbestosis, which may develop into a lifethreatening disease. The Supreme Court recognized that this situation may warrant recovery
since the claim is now more “genuine and serious” emotional distress. See Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 156–57 (2003); Rabin, supra note 105, at 1201. The lower
courts remain divided on the duty to compensate for emotional distress in the “precursordisease” context. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1201–02.
113. See Rabin, supra note 69, at 425–26 (“The diversity of treatment of NIED claims has
floodgates written all over it.”).
114. See id. at 430. As Professor Rabin states: “Boundless litigation is, from the judicial
perspective, an attack on the very foundations of tort law: from a judicial administration
vantage point, the capacity to process cases efficiently, and from the parties’ vantage point, a
recognition of claims to ‘just deserts’ in the face of prospectively insolvent responsible
parties.” Id.
115. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 444.
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no longer be maintained, the case for differential promotion in values falls
away as well. Instead, the presumption should be that we strike the same
balance between individual and social interests for NIED claims as for other
negligence claims and, as we restore this balance, the burden should shift to
those who would argue otherwise. In other words, as we learn more about
the validity of emotional harm, we should promote more prominently the
value of corrective justice and recognition of victims’ rights. The next part
explores developments in science and medicine and how they have begun to
change our normative view of emotional harm as well.
III. DEFINING THE HARM: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND COMMON SENSE
Common law courts have struggled with the legal definition of emotional
harm in their quest to distinguish worthy from unworthy NIED claims.
Defining what it means to be harmed emotionally depends critically on the
framework used to examine the question—whether from a scientific,
medical, or normative perspective. These three viewpoints influence each
other and offer different, but overlapping, ways to define emotional harm.
Legal definitions frequently reflect an attempt to create an amalgam of all
of these perspectives, while trying to address different theoretical and
policy concerns.
When courts began to recognize the tort of NIED, a major definitional
concern was addressing the subjectivity associated with the harm and the
potential for fraud. Courts distinguished emotional from physical harm
because it is a mental state not directly observable by others that is highly
subjective, based mostly on self-reporting. This could lead, in turn, to the
ability by plaintiffs to feign emotional injuries to get compensation, leading
to excessive and fictitious lawsuits.116
Although courts continue to maintain the distinction between recognition
of physical harm and emotional harm, there has been a movement in
science and medicine away from a strong distinction between those harms.
Both scientists and scholars have moved away from explanations that treat
“mental” and “physical” as separate categories. Neuroscientists have begun
to develop new models of looking at the interaction between mind and
116. Many of the same problems, such as subjectivity, measurement uncertainty, and
potential for fraud, exist with pain and suffering associated with physical injuries. These
parasitic damages have not concerned courts in the same way, perhaps because courts are
willing to say it is easier to believe that pain and mental suffering occurs following a
physical injury. See Goldberg, supra note 87, at 823 n.68 (“[P]arasitic damages ‘avoid[] the
trivial or fraudulent claims that have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective
nature of [emotional] injuries.’” (quoting Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521,
527 (Tenn. 2008))). This only gets the plaintiff over the threshold, however. The level of
pain and suffering that a plaintiff experiences presents the same difficulties as in the NIED
context, and yet courts allow the pain and suffering elements in the conventional tort injury
cases full consideration by jurors. Perhaps the difference is that the tort system is not really
addressing compensation for the mental element, but allowing an offset for the legal fees that
cut into the special damages and restoring full compensation for the physical injuries. But
see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1673–74 (theorizing that emotional tranquility
on its own, except rarely, is insufficient to impose duty on defendants to protect others’
emotional well-being).
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body.117 Scholars have begun to integrate this in their view of looking at
legal questions.118 And even courts have begun to recognize that the
distinction between mind and body has become blurred.119 As these
changes occur, we will need to recognize them in the jurisprudence of
NIED as well. At the outset, those changes may force courts to unpack
validity from other concerns and allow us to address the differing concerns
through different judicial mechanisms.
A. Scientific Advances in Assessing the “Neural Basis of Emotion”
Although the field is in the early stages, neuroscience advances may
someday allow us to measure physiological changes in the brain regions
that occur after a traumatic event.120 These advances are significant
because they may offer a way to document physical changes that result
from emotional harm, allowing us to verify and objectively measure a claim
of emotional harm. In other words, these advances suggest a potential,
objective biomarker of emotional harm. Through the use of neuroscience
and neuroimaging, scientists have begun to link cognitive disorders from
exposure to trauma to neurological conditions.121 While individual
differences such as age, gender, and genetics may influence whether an
individual will develop a cognitive disorder following a traumatic event,
neuroscientists have come to understand that dysfunction occurs in the
neural systems that regulate emotion when an individual experiences acute
stress.122
117. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 97.
118. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); PETER ALCES, THE MORAL INTERSECTION OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE
41 (Univ. Chicago forthcoming 2017) (“Once we have a way to ‘see’ emotional injury as
clearly as we can ‘see’ a broken bone . . . there would be no reason to maintain the tort law’s
distinction between physical and emotional injury.”); Shaun Cassin, Eggshell Minds and
Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?,
50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 954 (2013) (“Neuroscience is making it harder to support a legal
distinction between physical and emotional injuries.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996);
Kolber, supra note 97.
119. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008) (ruling that PTSD suffered by the plaintiff was a bodily injury to the brain). In the
context of insurance policies, many courts have found emotional harm constitutes “bodily
injury.” See Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 501 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1993) (finding that whether
a claimant suffered “bodily injury” involved “a medical or psychological problem of proof
rather than purely a question of law . . . . [Compensation] should not therefore turn on any
artificial and arbitrary classification such as ‘physical’ or ‘psychological’”); Trinh v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that defendant experienced
physiologic/neurobiologic injuries as a direct result of her PTSD).
120. This section draws on my earlier work, see supra note 18, as well as others. See
Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807 (2014); Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How
Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
235 (2012).
121. See, e.g., Amir Garakani et al., Neurobiology of Anxiety Disorders and Implications
for Treatment, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 941 (2006).
122. Kevin N. Ochsner et al., Neural Correlates of Individual Differences in Pain-Related
Fear and Anxiety, 120 PAIN 69, 69–70 (2006); Jason J. Radley et al., Stress Risk Factors and

2015]

THE FUTURE OF EMOTIONAL HARM

2625

Neuroscientist and Professor Joseph E. LeDoux is an early advocate of
the view that emotions, like other physical sensations, result from
physiological processes and therefore can be studied objectively.123 He
explains:
If we want to understand feelings, it is likely going to be necessary to
figure out how the more basic systems work. Failure to come to terms
theoretically with the importance of processing systems that operate
essentially unconsciously has been a major impediment to progress in
understanding the neural basis of emotion. To overcome this, brain
researchers need to be more savvy about the nature of emotions, rather
than simply relying on common sense beliefs about emotions as
subjective feeling states.124

Researchers are heeding LeDoux’s call to investigate the “neural basis of
emotion.”125 In particular, an increased awareness of PTSD and traumarelated disorders, as well as troops returning from wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan with trauma-related disorders, has led to an increase in
research funding for PTSD since 2007.126 Resulting research has begun to
shed light on the specific neural circuitry dedicated to emotional function.
Evidence indicates that individuals with psychiatric disorders have
abnormalities in these neural circuitry systems and exposure to traumatic
events can change this circuitry in previously healthy individuals.127
Witnessing or experiencing a traumatic event results in a state described
as acute stress, characterized by activation of a number of hormonal and
neurotransmitter systems.128 These systems trigger a chain of chemical
processes that result in alterations in the neural networks that regulate

Stress-Related Pathology: Neuroplasticity, Epigenetics and Endophenotypes, 14 STRESS
481, 481–82 (2011).
123. See Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotional Circuits in the Brain, 23 ANN. REV.
NEUROSCIENCE 155, 156 (2000).
124. Id. at 157.
125. See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., The Experience of Emotion, 58 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 373 (2007); Naomi I. Eisenberger, Identifying the Neural Correlates Underlying
Social Pain: Implications for Developmental Processes, 49 HUM. DEV. 273 (2006); Ethan
Kross et al., Coping with Emotions Past: The Neural Bases of Regulating Affect Associated
with Negative Autobiographical Memories, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 361 (2009);
Ochsner et al., supra note 122.
126. Editorial, Neuropharmacology Special Issue on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD): Current State of the Art in Clinical and Preclinical PTSD Research, 62
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 539, 539 (2012).
127. Adriana Feder et al., Psychobiology and Molecular Genetics of Resilience, 10
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 446, 451–52 (2009); Roger K. Pitman et al., Investigating the
Pathogenesis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with Neuroimaging, 62 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY
47, supp. 17 (2001).
128. Roger K. Pitman et al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder with Propranolol, 51 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 189, 190–92 (2002); Benno
Roozendaal et al., Stress, Memory and the Amygdala, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCe 423,
427 (2009); Yvonne M. Ulrich-Lai & James P. Herman, Neural Regulation of Endocrine and
Autonomic Stress Responses, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 397, 404 (2009).
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memory and fear.129 These physiological changes can materialize in the
form of emotional distress symptoms, particularly anxiety symptoms.130
Extensive and replicated research has revealed several brain regions that
are associated with emotional trauma.131 Research suggests emotional
disorders from trauma occur when this circuitry malfunctions.132
This section proceeds in two parts: (1) it describes briefly the processes,
structures, and neural networks underlying memory and fear that are
believed to be foundational to emotional harm; and (2) it highlights studies
indicating the dysfunction that occurs when an individual experiences
trauma and stress-related disorders, focusing in particular on the disorder of
PTSD.133 The focus on PTSD is appropriate for several reasons. As noted
above, PTSD is probably the most heavily researched trauma-related
disorder in neuroscience at this stage. Further, PTSD is comparable to what
we recognize as emotional harm in law, since the disorder is traumainduced and has a delayed manifestation of outward symptoms. Moreover,
development of PTSD is relatively frequent in individuals exposed to
trauma: researchers estimate 10 to 15 percent of individuals exposed to
trauma will develop the disorder, and 6.8 percent of Americans will
experience PTSD at some point in their lifetime.134

129. Pitman et al., supra note 128, at 189; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 424;
Ulrich-Lai & Herman, supra note 128, at 398.
130. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 427.
131. In particular, structural and functional neuroimaging results implicate the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, the locus coeruleus (LC)-noradrenergic systems,
the amygdala, hippocampus, specific subregions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC),
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulated (ACC) and insular cortices, in the processing
and storage of stressful events and emotional information. Cora Hubner et al., Ex Vivo
Dissection of Optogenetically Activated mPFC and Hippocampal Inputs to Neurons in the
Basolateral Amygdala: Implications for Fear and Emotional Memory, 8 FRONTIERS BEHAV.
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1–5 (2014); Martin P. Paulus, The Role of Neuroimaging for the Diagnosis
and Treatment of Anxiety Disorders, 25 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 348, 349 (2008); Pitman et
al., supra note 128, at 189; Kelly Skelton et al., PTSD and Gene Variants: New Pathways
and New Thinking, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 628, 631 (2012); Hidenori Yamasue et al.,
Gender-Common and -Specific Neuroanatomical Basis of Human Anxiety-Related
Personality Traits, 18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 46, 46 (2007).
132. Paulus, supra note 131, at 351–52.
133. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is classified as a traumatic and stress-related
disorder in the DSM-5. The essential element of PTSD is the development of certain
symptoms after exposure to an extremely traumatic event or experience that involves actual
or threatened death or serious injury to oneself or others. The categories of symptoms
resulting from exposure to the triggering event include persistent reexperiencing of the
trauma, persistent negative cognitions and mood, avoidance of stimuli associated with the
trauma and a numbing of general responsiveness, as well as a number of symptoms
associated with increased arousal. To receive a diagnosis of PTSD, these symptoms must be
present for more than one month, must interfere with regular functioning, and must not be
attributable to a medication, substance use, or other illness. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81 (5th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter DSM-5]. Otherwise, the individual is eligible for a diagnosis of acute stress
disorder, which will change to PTSD if the symptoms are still present one month after the
trauma occurred. Id. § 308.3.
134. Thomas Steckler & Victoria Risbrough, Pharmacological Treatment of PTSD—
Established and New Approaches, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 617, 617 (2012).
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1. The Neural Foundations of Memory and Fear
Learning, memory, and perception are all involved in experiencing acute
stress.135 Learning and memory are complex processes in which neurons
modulate the strength and structure of their interconnections.136 These
processes are a type of brain plasticity, which is the relatively rapid and
Studies in
reversible change in brain structure and function.137
neuroscience indicate that even a single exposure to a traumatic event can
cause long-lasting cellular changes (or stress-induced plasticity) in the
amygdala, the structure believed to be central to both anxiety and
memory.138
When an individual experiences stress, the experience is encoded into the
working memory, the short-term memory,139 and finally consolidated into
the long-term memory.140 Memories are stored in the form of an increase
in synaptic strength or in the pattern of the synapses themselves.141 The
consolidation process involves the transfer of information from labile,
short-term memory into long-term memory.142 The consolidation process
enables the interpretation of emotional information as well as controls the
mechanisms that influence what individuals perceive in their environment
and how they interpret that information (the attentional and interpretive
processes).143
The brain is very efficient in creating long-term memories of emotionally
significant events, both positive and traumatic.144 Two key structures are
135. James L. McGaugh & Benno Roozendaal, Memory Modulation, in LEARNING AND
MEMORY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE 521–53 (John H. Byrne ed. 2009).
136. Id.
137. Rudi De Raedt, Does Neuroscience Hold Promise for the Further Development of
Behavior Therapy? The Case of Emotional Change After Exposure in Anxiety and
Depression, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 225, 226 (2006); see also Feder et al., supra note
127, at 453.
138. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 429.
139. Short-term memory is the modification of already synthesized molecules, which
strengthens existing connections. Kelsey C. Martin et al., Molecular Mechanisms Underlying
Learning-Related Long-Lasting Synaptic Plasticity, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES
121 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2000).
140. Long-term memory involves the synthesis of new messenger RNA and new proteins,
a process that can result in the induction and stabilization of long-lasting forms of entirely
new synthesized neural connections. Gary Lynch, Memory Consolidation and Long-Term
Potentiation, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 139, at 139. See generally
Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways That Impair Prefrontal Cortex Structure and
Function, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 410 (2009); Robert S. Blumenfeld & Charan
Ranganath, Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Promotes Long-Term Memory Formation
Through its Role in Working Memory Organization, 26 J. NEUROSCIENCE 916 (2006).
141. Lynch, supra note 140, at 139.
142. Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 944–45; Oliver T. Wolf, Stress and Memory in
Humans: Twelve Years of Progress?, 1293 BRAIN RES. 142, 144 (2009).
143. LeDoux, supra note 123, at 174; Wolf, supra note 142, at 147.
144. James L. McGaugh, Memory Consolidation and the Amygdala:
A Systems
Perspective, 25 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 456, 456 (2002); McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra
note 135, at 521. Emotionally significant experiences tend to be well remembered.
McGaugh, supra note 144, at 456; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423; Wolf, supra
note 142, at 148–49.
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associated with this process. The amygdala, or the “emotion center,”
stimulates the “arousal system” when trauma and stress are experienced,145
and the prefrontal cortex is considered the controlling mechanism to keep
our emotions in check. The prefrontal cortex regulates our experience of
emotion and naturally compensates for aversive events. When functioning
properly the prefrontal cortex facilitates the formation of new connections
that override the traumatic memory, a process called extinction.146
The consolidation of a traumatic memory forms the basis for trauma and
stress-related disorders, including PTSD.147 The amygdala and the
prefrontal cortex circuitry is central to this process.148 Research suggests
that when this circuitry is disrupted, anxiety results.149 This is because the
amygdala is hyperactive and the controlling mechanisms in the prefrontal
cortex are inadequately recruited. In other words, acute stress impairs the
prefrontal cortical function.150 This malfunction or dysregulation leads to
alterations in interpretive processes, or more precisely, a threat-oriented
bias in anxious individuals. As a result of this bias, individuals with anxiety
disorders react to stimuli that objectively would be interpreted as neutral or
only mildly aversive with distress, hyperarousal, and attempts to avoid the
anxiety-provoking object or situation.151
During and following a stressful event, the brain is flooded with stress
hormones, which results in a number of physiological changes to the neural
networks that regulate memory and fear.152 The flooding of stress
hormones solidifies the memory of the trauma by enhancing the
consolidation process of the mental and emotional experience of the
event.153 In addition, the neurotransmitter norepinephrine has a central role
in regulating stress effects on memory consolidation.154
145. McGaugh, supra note 144, at 456–57 (discussing how the basolateral complex of the
amygdala (BLA) is activated by emotional arousal and helps make significant experiences
memorable by enhancing the consolidation of long-lasting memory in other brain regions);
Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423.
146. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 427, 430–31.
147. Pitman et al., supra note 128, at 189.
148. Amit Etkin & Tor D. Wager, Functional Neuroimaging of Anxiety: A Meta-Analysis
of Emotional Processing in PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia, 164 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1476, 1484 (2007); Kevin S. LaBar et al., Human Amygdala Activation During
Conditioned Fear Acquisition and Extinction: A Mixed-Trial fMRI Study, 20 NEURON 937,
939 (1998); Ulrich-Lai & Herman, supra note 128, at 401.
149. Sonja J. Bishop, Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Anxiety: An Integrative Account, 11
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 307, 308 (2007); see Richard A. Friedman, Why Teenagers Act
Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2014, at SR1 (describing amygdala and prefrontal cortex circuit
dysfunction in anxiety disorders).
150. Arnsten, supra note 140, at 410–11.
151. Bishop, supra note 149, at 307.
152. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 424–25.
153. McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra note 135, at 205.
154. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423–25. Noradrenergic activity in the BLA is
critical to modulating other hormones and transmitters involved in memory consolidation. A
neurotransmitter system comprised of noradrenergic neurons is how norepinephrine is
transmitted through the brain. Noradrenergic neurons act on adrenergic receptors located in
the amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, thalamus, as well as numerous other brain
structures and the spinal cord. Because of the large number of areas that contain adrenergic
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During acute stress, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
becomes hyperactive. This hyperactivity affects the delicate balance of
neurochemicals in an individual and has been shown to cause illness.155
Chronic activation of the HPA axis can cause elevated levels of cortisol in
the body, which can cause atrophy of the hippocampus.156 Studies show
that this series of events—adrenal stress hormones which trigger the
regulation and consolidation of memory—holds true for emotionally
arousing information, such as trauma and stress, but does not affect the
consolidation of memory of emotionally neutral information.157 When
memory is “retrieved,” the fear response can be retriggered, which forms
the basis for PTSD.158
2. Neuroscience Studies of PTSD
Scientists study disproportionate fear responses by using fear
conditioning,159 and focusing on different parts of the brain, to gain
valuable insight into the origins and neural bases of those responses.160 The
lateral amygdala has been a primary structure of interest in the study of
memory and fear,161 and research studying fear conditioning in both
animals and humans supports the hypothesis that a common element of
PTSD specifically, and emotional distress in general, may be amygdalar
dysfunction.162 Recent research reveals that dysfunction in PTSD goes
beyond the amygdala itself and encompasses the corticolimbic circuit,

receptors, when the norepinephrine system is activated, a significant area of the brain is
affected. The BLA influences the consolidation of memory through its many connections to
other brain structures. The BLA projects directly to the caudate nucleus and both directly
and indirectly to the hippocampus. The BLA also has connections to the insular cortex,
which other studies have revealed is a common denominator in the manifestation and
maintenance of anxiety disorders. Id.; McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra note 135, at 205.
155. Mario Francisco Juruena, An Integrative Science Approach: Neuroscience in the
DSM-V and ICD-11, 23 ACTA NEUROPSYCHIATRICA 143, 143 (2011).
156. Michael Randall, The Physiology of Stress: Cortisol and the HypothalamicPituitary-Adrenal Axis, DARTMOUTH UNDERGRADUATE J. SCI. (2010), available at
http://dujs.dartmouth.edu/fall-2010/the-physiology-of-stress-cortisol-and-the-hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal-axis#.U5ltEfmwLec.
157. McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra note 135, at 208; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128,
at 423.
158. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423.
159. The Pavlovian fear-conditioning paradigm is the classic way to study fear
conditioning in healthy control subjects. Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 941; Diane B.
Paul & Arthur L. Blumenthal, On the Trail of Little Albert, 39 PSYCHOL. REC. 547, 547–49
(1989); John B. Watson & Rosalie Rayner, Conditioned Emotional Reactions, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2–3 (1920).
160. Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 941; LaBar et al., supra note 148, at 937.
161. LeDoux, supra note 123, at 161, 167; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 424.
162. Bishop, supra note 149, at 307; M. Davis & P.J. Whalen, The Amygdala: Vigilance
and Emotion, 6 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 13, 13 (2001); Garakani et al., supra note 121, at
942; LeDoux, supra note 123, at 171; Elisabeth A. Murray, The Amygdala, Reward and
Emotion, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 489, 491–92 (2007); Gleb P. Shumyatsky et al.,
Identification of a Signaling Network in Lateral Nucleus of Amygdala Important for
Inhibiting Memory Specifically Related to Learned Fear, 111 CELL 905, 905 (2002); Wolf,
supra note 142, at 147.
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which includes the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala.163 In
addition, studies suggest that PTSD sufferers may have a preexisting
genetic vulnerability of the HPA axis, which increases the likelihood of
HPA dysregulation after acute trauma exposure and a higher likelihood of
developing PTSD or other stress-related disorders.164
Neuroimaging results in human subjects using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) show that fear conditioning leads to increases in
amygdalar activity.165 Once the amygdala detects danger, it can activate
various “arousal” networks, which then can influence sensory
processing.166 Following fear conditioning, the information transmitted
from the amygdala results in the individual experiencing and exhibiting a
Functional MRI studies have also revealed the
fear response.167
relationship between the amygdala and medial prefrontal regions in
PTSD.168
For example, a 2004 study compared PET scans of thirty-six Vietnam
veterans with diagnosed PTSD to PET scans of Vietnam veterans without
PTSD.169 Results of the study indicated hyperresponsivity of the amygdala
and hyporesponsivity of medial prefrontal regions and that these responses
are reciprocally related.170 The more hyper- and hypoactive these regions
were, the more severe the symptoms. These results support the hypothesis
that PTSD symptoms reflect extreme dysregulation in these regions and
neural mechanisms. While such a relationship between the amygdala and
medial prefrontal regions in clinically diagnosed PTSD patients had been
suspected, no previous studies in the literature had documented data in
support of such a relationship.
Studies have also begun to document and distinguish at the chemical and
structural level between PTSD and other anxiety disorders. In 2007, Etkin
and Wager conducted a meta-analysis of studies that had used brain scans to
investigate emotional processing in patients with anxiety disorders.171 The
meta-analysis compared fMRI and PET scans of individuals with one of
163. See Steckler & Risbrough, supra note 134, at 617.
164. Rachel Yehuda, Status of Glucocorticoid Alterations in Post-traumatic Stress
Disorder, 1179 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 56, 58 (2009).
165. Christian Büchel et al., Brain Systems Mediating Aversive Conditioning: An EventRelated fMRI Study, 20 NEURON 947, 954 (1998); LaBar et al., supra note 148, at 937.
166. See LeDoux, supra note 123, at 177; Etkin & Wager, supra note 148, at 1482
(stating that information is transmitted from the amygdala to the behavioral, autonomic, and
endocrine response control systems located in the brainstems).
167. Shumyatsky et al., supra note 162, at 905.
168. See generally Lisa M. Shin et al., Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in the Amygdala
and Medial Prefrontal Cortex During Traumatic Imagery in Male and Female Vietnam
Veterans with PTSD, 61 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (2004).
169. Id. at 169. The researchers used script-driven imagery to conduct the study. Id. All
of the male participants had served in combat and all of the female participants had served as
nurses in Vietnam. Id. None of the veterans had a history of head injury, neurological
disorders, or other major conditions. Id.
170. Id. The reciprocal or inverse relationship between the two regions means that as the
amygdala becomes more active or hyperresponsive, the prefrontal cortex becomes more
inhibited or hyporesponsive.
171. Etkin & Wager, supra note 148, at 1476.
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three anxiety disorders—PTSD, social anxiety disorder, and specific
phobia—with the scans of healthy individuals who had undergone fear
conditioning. The results indicated that patients with the anxiety disorders
showed consistently greater activity in the amygdala and insula.172 Even
more significant, the dysregulation in the neural circuitry of PTSD patients
was more exaggerated than that of patients suffering from the other anxiety
disorders.173 The results of this study have revealed both that the amygdala
and insula are critical structures in the common neurobiological pathway in
anxiety disorders and support the view that a core fear system exists and
when it is activated, anxiogenic174 symptoms result.175
Recent studies reveal further importance of the anterior cingulated
corteces in PTSD. In 2008, Kasai compared twins with combat-related
PTSD to their co-twins who had no history of trauma. The PTSD group
had lower gray matter volumes in the subgenual anterior cingulated cortex
(sACC) compared to their non-PTSD co-twins.176 This finding is
significant because it suggests that abnormalities in the sACC are a marker
for PTSD instead of a risk factor for the disorder. A similar study examined
the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (dACC) and found both PTSD twins
and their non-PTSD co-twins had increased metabolic rates in their
dACC.177 Since the abnormalities were the same in both twins, the effect is
considered a risk factor for developing PTSD.178
Studies suggest that the dACC plays a crucial part in both physical and
emotional pain.179 Chronic pain patients who have their dACC removed
say that they can still feel the pain but it no longer bothers them, linking
unpleasantness with the physical sensation.180 A recent neuroimaging study
tested “social pain” reactions among subjects and found that the dACC
172. See id. at 1480–81.
173. Id. Only patients with PTSD showed hypoactivation in the dorsal and rostral
anterior cingulated cortices and ventromedial prefrontal cortex—additional structures linked
to the experience and regulation of emotion. Id. The effects unique to PTSD suggest that
emotional dysregulation in that situation extends beyond an exaggerated fear response or
beyond the fear response demonstrated in other diagnosable (medically significant) anxiety
and trauma-related disorders. Id.
174. Anxiogenic is synonymous with reflecting, causing, or producing anxiety; not every
anxiety disorder reaches the level of PTSD. Some individuals may simply experience
generalized disturbances in anxiety or mood. But neuroscience advances now indicate that
that these neural changes occur for anxiety disorder in general, with individuals diagnosed
with PTSD displaying the most dramatic alterations in neural circuitry and consequently the
most severe symptoms. Id.
175. Id. at 1485.
176. Kiyoto Kasai et al., Evidence for Acquired Pregenual Anterior Cingulate Gray
Matter Loss from a Twin Study of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 63
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 550, 550 (2008).
177. Lisa M. Shin et al., Exaggerated Activation of Dorsal Anterior Cingulate Cortex
During Cognitive Interference: A Monozygotic Twin Study of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 198 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 983 (2011).
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Naomi I. Eisenberger, Broken Hearts and Broken Bones: A Neural
Perspective on the Similarities Between Social and Physical Pain, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
PSYCHOL. SCI. 42 (2012).
180. Id. at 43.
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response in individuals who were socially excluded experienced heightened
dACC activity compared to those who were not.181 This suggests that
physical pain and emotional pain are not that different as registered in the
brain scan.
PTSD can also quantifiably affect the hippocampus. A meta-analysis of
structural MRI results in 2005 revealed that trauma-exposed individuals
with PTSD had significantly decreased bilateral hippocampal gray matter
than healthy controls and trauma-exposed controls without PTSD.182
Several meta-analyses using other imaging mechanisms have revealed
similar results.183 Another study suggests that hippocampal abnormalities
may be the key to explaining symptomology of PTSD.184
As discussed above, acute stress results in neuronal remodeling through
the creation of new synaptic connections in the basolateral amygdala (BLA)
and medial amygdala. Some research reveals that a brief exposure to stress
triggers a series of cellular changes that take time to come to an end,
meaning there is a delay in the time it takes for the cellular changes in the
BLA to be completed.185 The result of this time delay is that once
triggered, the plasticity mechanisms continue after the event, despite
restoration of normal levels of neurotransmitters and hormones.186 This
means that a single brief exposure to stress results in some modest
structural changes at the synaptic level that take time to build up and to
slow down—that is, they have delayed anxiogenic effects at the behavioral
level.187
This finding—that even a single exposure to a traumatic event can cause
long-lasting cellular changes, or stress-induced plasticity, in the brain—is
highly significant. It may be an important mechanism in the development
of trauma-related disorders such as PTSD. Retrieving the memory of
“emotionally arousing information induces greater activity in and
connectivity between the amygdala and the hippocampus” than retrieving
the memory of emotionally neutral information.188 This evidence suggests
that emotionally relevant and emotionally neutral information are treated
differently and stored through different mechanisms and processes in the
brain.
181. Id. at 45.
182. Noriyuki Kitayama et al., Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Measurement of
Hippocampal Volume in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Meta-Analysis, 88 J. AFFECTIVE
DISORDERS 79, 79–86 (2005).
183. Dean T. Acheson et al., Hippocampal Dysfunction Effects on Context Memory:
Possible Etiology for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 674, 676–
77 (2012).
184. See generally Chris R. Brewin et al., Intrusive Images in Psychological Disorders:
Characteristics, Neural Mechanisms, and Treatment Implications, 117 PSYCHOL. REV. 210
(2010). It is unclear, however, whether the hippocampal abnormalities existed prior to acute
trauma and therefore serve as a risk factor for developing the disorder or if they are
symptomatic of the disorder itself. Acheson et al., supra note 183, at 681.
185. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 429 fig.5.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 426.
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Animal research further illustrates the importance of the hippocampalamygdalar circuit in PTSD.189 In one study, the authors focused on the
inability of PTSD sufferers to restrict fear responses to appropriate
predictors—i.e., panicking inappropriately when a car backfires. Noting
that glucocorticoids increase stress and have been shown to be involved in
the pathophysiology of PTSD, the team injected corticosterone into the
dorsal hippocampi of one group of rats and tested their fear response
against a control group.190 As predicted, the corticosterone group displayed
inappropriate fear responses similar to PTSD symptoms.191 This study
provides solid evidence for one potential mechanism of PTSD.
New research is also beginning to connect mild traumatic brain injury
(mTBI) to PTSD. Veterans with mTBI develop PTSD at a higher rate than
others.192 A recent meta-analysis found overlap in abnormality in the
middle frontal gyrus in both PTSD and mTBI.193 Other researchers suggest
that there may be dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbital frontal cortex,
autonomic nervous system, and hippocampus involvement, but fMRI
research on mTBI is too limited to gain an accurate picture of the
relationship right now.194 With increased attention focused on the
detrimental effects of sports concussions and combat mTBI, there will
likely be more studies examining the relationship between the two disorders
in the near future.
In sum, the physiological changes that occur in the brain after an
individual experiences or witnesses a traumatic event can result in a
dysfunction of the neural networks that regulate memory and fear.195 Even
though the only clinical symptoms the individual may demonstrate are
emotional in nature, scientists may now begin to document and observe
multiple physiological changes that occur in the brain after experiencing
trauma as a result of advanced neuroimaging techniques.196 The fact that
189. See generally Nadia Kaouane et al., Glucocorticoids Can Induce PTSD-Like
Memory Impairments in Mice, 335 SCI. 1510 (2012).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Jon B. Williamson et al., A Possible Mechanism for PTSD Symptoms in Patients
with Traumatic Brain Injury: Central Autonomic Network Disruption, 6 FRONTIERS
NEUROENGINEERING 1 (2013).
193. Alan N. Simmons & Scott C. Matthews, Neural Circuitry of PTSD With or Without
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury: A Meta-Analysis, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 598, 602 (2012).
194. See id.; Williamson et al., supra note 192, at 3.
195. See, e.g., Arnsten, supra note 140, at 410; Bishop, supra note 149, at 307; Etkin &
Wager, supra note 148, at 1476; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 430; Shumyatsky et
al., supra note 162, at 905–06.
196. Limitations to applying neuroscience studies to legal questions are not insignificant.
See, e.g., Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly:
Functional
Neuroimaging As Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1119, 1167 (2010); Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶¶ 29–30, 36–38. These problems include
establishing the plaintiff’s baseline; extrapolating information from generalized studies to an
individual, or “individuation”; and dealing with the different paces at which science will
document different disorders. See Grey, supra note 18, at 226. Further, in neuroscience
studies involving emotional harm, the neuroscience measures are tested by reference to
conventional measures, such as behavior, questionnaires, self-reporting, and clinical
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we have begun to detect these changes through neuroscience gives us the
opportunity to quantify the effects of a stressful event without relying on
self-reporting. This evidence is beginning to enter the legal landscape in
various ways,197 although it has not yet gained widespread use in the NIED
area.
B. Medical Definition of Emotional Harm
Medicine, and more specifically psychiatry, offer a related definitional
approach to emotional harm, and it has received more widespread use in
court. Some courts have medicalized the legal definition completely,
creating one of the highest thresholds for proof of emotional harm. In
particular, the British courts have long insisted upon a “recognized
psychiatric illness” (RPI) as a threshold requirement for recovery for NIED.
This rule was designed as a “powerful control mechanism” to meet the
instrumentalist and normative concerns of curtailing the claim.198 This test
has been adopted by other common law countries as well.199
The RPI threshold requirement has been justified on three familiar
grounds: (1) as a mechanism to promote the policy of controlling the
number and types of mental harm claims, thereby reducing the risk of
indeterminate liability;200 (2) as a way to preclude mere anxiety, grief, or
other “normal” suffering, which are considered “too remote to be
compensable,” even if those harms are “reasonably foreseeable”;201 and

diagnoses. In other words, we validate our new tools with our old tools. We have not yet
reached the point at which these variables are an independent (and presumably more
dependable) measure. A brain scan alone does not answer the question whether an
individual has suffered emotional harm; the researcher must look to other indicia. Moreover,
there may be imperfect correspondence between brain changes and behavioral dysfunction.
We could measure changes in the brain that have no (or not yet any) manifestation in
emotion, cognition, or behavior. Or the experienced changes in emotion, cognition, and
behavior may be present, but not (or not yet) observable in brain changes. And there is
always a danger that juries will prefer the evidence of neuroimaging over other forms of
evidence, given our cultural addiction to faith in what is “physical,” although some studies
suggest otherwise. See Nicholas J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages As Evidence in a Mens
Rea Defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 366 (2011) (finding no
evidence that neuroimaging unduly influences juries over verbal neuroscience-based
evidence; neuroscience evidence was more effective than clinical psychological evidence but
the effect did not translate into differences in juries). But while these limitations may be
fodder for evidentiary challenges or cross-examination, it does not justify an absolute legal
barrier to use of brain scan technology in this area.
197. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort
Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 235, 249–52 (2012).
198. Rachael Mulheron, Rewriting the Requirements for a “Recognized Psychiatric
Injury” in Negligence Claims, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 78 (2012).
199. See, e.g., ALLEN M. LINDEN & BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 389–90
(9th ed. 2011); SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER ON DAMAGES FOR PSYCHIATRIC
INJURY app. A, at 2.7 (2002), available at http://www.bailii.org/scot/other/SLC/DP/2002
/120.html; Danuta Mendelson, The Modern Australian Law of Mental Harm: Parochialism
Triumphant, 13 J.L. & MED. 164, 173 (2005).
200. Mulheron, supra note 198, at 82.
201. Id. at 83.

2015]

THE FUTURE OF EMOTIONAL HARM

2635

(3) as a way to create a de minimis rule of damages, regardless of how
harmful the anxiety or distress may be to the individual claimant.202
The RPI test has been subject to numerous criticisms.203 Most
significantly, critics note that the medical and legal approaches have
different goals: while the medical community is concerned with diagnosis
and treatment, the law of emotional harm is concerned with whether the
claimant has suffered and is entitled to compensation for some emotional
harm.204 The main approach of the psychiatric diagnosis is to use
diagnostic checklists based on clinical features, which were designed to
give more reliability to clinical diagnoses when planning treatment.205 This
means that a clinical diagnosis and the facts and judgment on which it is
based may not align closely to the questions of concern in the law.206
Further, some argue that reliance upon the classifications is problematic
regardless of those differences, given that the diagnostic criteria change
over time and may not be incorporated into the classifications.207
Furthermore, although an RPI may reflect a longer-lasting psychiatric
illness rather than a temporary problem of emotional distress,208 using an
RPI to define emotional harm in law has been criticized as giving rise to
inconsistencies and distortions in the law and as no longer being supported
in the modern era.209 Some argue that a lower threshold—casting a wider
net—should be sufficient to trigger a compensable emotional harm in
negligence.210 Lowering the threshold would eliminate the problem of
denying compensation to emotional suffering that is something less than a
positive psychiatric illness.211 At the same time, the Restatement (Third)

202. Id. at 84.
203. See id. at 85.
204. See id. at 87.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 88.
207. Id. at 85. At some point, the advances in neuroscience in detecting mental illness
presumably will merge with psychiatry and become part of the diagnostic analysis. See infra
note 250.
208. See HARVEY TEFF, CAUSING PSYCHIATRIC AND EMOTIONAL HARM 144 (2009)
(explaining that adoption of RPI test was intended “to exclude liability for transient distress
of minimal impact”); see also PETER R. HANDFORD & NICHOLAS J. MULLANY, TORT
LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC DAMAGE 81 (2006).
209. HANDFORD & MULLANY, supra note 208, at 81. See generally Mulheron, supra note
198. Deidre Smith argues, in the context of describing the political history of the recognition
of PTSD by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the DSM-III:
The line between law and medicine is not merely blurred in PTSD; it is
absent . . . . If the law decides to address problems of justice by looking to
psychiatry or other branches of medicine and science for solutions, it must only do
so with a full appreciation and understanding of the origins and limitations of the
concepts it seeks to adopt. Absent such acknowledgement, together with a
determination that such concepts are in fact appropriate to import into law, the
legal system simply delegates juridical authority to those fields.
Dierdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability:
The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 66–69 (2011).
210. See Mulheron, supra note 198, at 107.
211. See id. at 109.
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views its test of “serious emotional harm” as having more commonality
than difference with the British test of RPI:
While there may be a modest difference between “serious emotional
harm,” the term employed in [the] Restatement, and “psychiatric injury,”
the British term, both terms have in common the effect of screening out
minor or modest emotional harm that most people confront in the course
of an interactive life in modern society.212

Regardless of whether it is used as the determinative test, or one of
several, the fundamental question is what constitutes a psychiatric injury
from a medical perspective. Two main diagnostic classification systems are
typically used by the psychiatric community to diagnose a recognized
psychiatric illness: (1) the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)213 of
the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the latest iteration of which is
the DSM-5; and (2) the International Classification of Diseases (ICD),214
sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO), which creates a
statistical classification of diseases, with a section on mental disorders. In
general, these systems demonstrate that the nature of psychiatric diagnosis
is constantly changing, and is not immune to political pressure.
1. DSM-5
The first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was published in 1952, with
106 disorders.215 That number has since grown to over 300 since the DSMIV,216 and the DSM-5 has approximately the same number of disorders
listed.217 As the quantity of disorders has increased, so has the DSM’s
recognition as the “Bible” for mental health issues. This widespread
influence is not limited to the practice of psychiatry or medical academia.
Insurance companies, litigators, and a number of patients’ rights and mental
health advocacy groups use the DSM for guidance.218 However, the latest
iteration of the manual, DSM-5, released in May 2013, has been broadly
criticized by practitioners and outsiders alike, sparking an unusually high
level of controversy compared to previous revisions.219 The DSM-5 has
been criticized as highly politicized, driven by special interests groups,

212. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM,
ch. 8 (2012) (Scope Note).
213. DSM-5, supra note 133.
214. WHO, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (2010), available at
http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en.
215. Margarita Tartakovsky, How the DSM Developed: What You Might Not Know,
PSYCHCENTRAL, http://psychcentral.com/blog/archives/2011/07/02/how-the-dsm-developedwhat-you-might-not-know/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
216. Id.
217. John M. Grohol, DSM-5 Released: The Big Changes, http://psychcentral.com/blog/
archives/2013/05/18/dsm-5-released-the-big-changes (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
218. See id.
219. Id.; Pam Belluck & Benedict Carey, Psychiatry’s New Guide Falls Short, Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2013, at A13; Sally L. Satel, Why the Fuss Over the D.S.M.-5?,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2013, at SR5 (discussing how the DSM-5 lacks validity, according to
experts).
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especially the pharmaceutical industry,220 and overinclusive.221 It also has
been criticized as failing in both reliability (the ability to render consistent
diagnoses) and validity (the ability to diagnose legitimate mental
illnesses).222 In general, the classifications are criticized because it is often
difficult to fit a disorder into a distinct category as opposed to placing the
disorder somewhere on a spectrum, and “modern psychiatry tends to aspire
to the former, as does the law, [but] a lot of the tests used in the diagnosis of
psychiatric disorder are of the latter sort.”223
The DSM-5 has been highly controversial. Allen Frances, the head of
the APA task force responsible for revising the DSM-IV, called the APA’s
220. Generally, critics have noted that the subjective nature of the diagnosis and treatment
of mental illness has made it a prime target for overprescription. Some mental health
professionals act as consultants to the drug industry. Michael Gross, Has the Manual Gone
Mental?, 23 CURRENT BIOLOGY R295, R297–98 (2013). Through them, the pharmaceutical
companies “may try to influence the revision of diagnostic criteria in [their] favor.” Id. at
R298. Additionally, the strain on the healthcare system for mental health providers and
dwindling primary doctor-patient interaction has made medication less expensive than longterm psychiatric therapy. Changes to the DSM-5 could lead to many diagnoses and drug
regimens. Paula Span, Grief Over New Depression Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013,
6:40 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/grief-over-new-depressiondiagnosis. Questions of the manual’s legitimacy also may come from within the APA itself.
Publishing profits from the DSM-5 may be considered an impure motive, an observation that
is exacerbated by the fact that the APA cancelled field-testing on the DSM-5 in order to
reign in an already $25 million outlay on its preparation. Allen J. Frances, DSM 5 Is Guide
Not Bible—Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 2, 2012),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bibleignore-its-ten-worst-changes. Allen Frances, chair of the DSM-IV task force and one of the
APA’s most outspoken critics, believes the conflict of interest lies elsewhere. He contends
that the current task force’s motives are not financial, but intellectual, resulting from “highly
specialized experts [valuing] their [own] pet ideas [and] areas of research interest.” Id.
221. One of the most hotly contested changes to the DSM-5 is the exclusion of the longstanding “bereavement exception” to the diagnosis of depression. Span, supra note 220.
This is an attempt to compensate for the chronic underdiagnosis of depression in elderly
patients, but practitioners fear that this will lead to a radical increase in the number of
diagnoses with simple symptoms commonly associated with the aging process. See Bruce E.
Levine, DSM-5: Science or Dogma? Even Some Establishment Psychiatrists Embarrassed
by
Newest
Diagnostic
Bible,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Feb.
11,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-e-levine/dsm-5_b_2657667.html. Other changes may
also increase diagnostic rates, such as the condensing of four previously distinct categories
of somatic disorders into one single category, see Gross, supra note 220, at R295, and the
introduction of the Minor Neurocognitive Disorder, which creates a “huge false positive” in
the elderly who are not at a particular risk of dementia. Frances, supra note 220.
222. Levine, supra note 221. The director of NIMH contends that the current DSM’s
greatest weakness is the lack of validity, because it is based on a subjective consensus of
symptom cluster. Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Transforming Diagnosis, NAT’L INST.
MENTAL HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/
transforming-diagnosis.shtml. Practitioners have questioned the research schemes for a
number of new DSM-5 diagnoses, specifically the latest personality disorders. Robert
Freedman et al., The Initial Field Trials of DSM-5: New Blooms and Old Thorns, 170 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 2–3 (2013). Other critics suggested that the research supporting the DSM5 is either no longer scientific or distorted. Paula J. Caplan, Psychiatry’s Bible, the DSM Is
Doing
More
Harm
Than
Good,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
27,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/psychiatrys-bible-the-dsm-is-doing-more-harmthan-good/2012/04/27/gIQAqy0WlT_story.html.
223. John E. Stannard, Sticks, Stones and Words: Emotional Harm and the English
Criminal Law, 74 J. CRIM. L. 533, 540 (2010).
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final approval of the DSM-5 “the saddest moment in [his] 45 year
career.”224 Other leading psychiatrists have branded it as a “broad
overreach” by the APA, suggesting that the DSM no longer be considered
the Bible but rather a dictionary for mental health diagnosis, at best.225
This controversy is especially troublesome for legal practitioners, as courts
may defer to the DSM’s definitions of mental illness in various ways.226
Perhaps most tellingly, the DSM is falling from its perch as the standard by
which mental health resources are allocated. Beginning in the fall of
2015,227 all HIPAA health care providers are required to switch to the
World Health Organization’s (ICD-10-CM) code sets.228 Additionally, the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is reorienting its research away
from the DSM categories and instead has begun to support research based
on empirical studies, focusing on genetic, imaging, psychological, and
cognitive data.229
2. ICD
The ICD is issued by the World Health Assembly, which comprises
health ministers from 193 countries.230 The latest iteration of the ICD, the
ICD-10, was issued in 1992, and the ICD-11 is scheduled for release in
2017.231
Unlike the DSM, the ICD attempts to catalogue all human disease, not
just mental disorders.232 Substantial differences exist between the DSM
and the ICD’s classifications of mental disorders. Some disorders find
stricter diagnostic criteria under the ICD and others are more liberal.233
Guidelines under the ICD do not include the social consequences of the
disorder whereas diagnosis under the DSM often requires significant social
impairment.234 The different definitions under the two classification
224. Frances, supra note 220.
225. Insel, supra note 222; Span, supra note 220.
226. See Caplan, supra note 222 (noting the use of employment disputes, custody battles,
and competency matters).
227. See Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-93, § 212, 128 Stat.
1040, 1047.
228. See, e.g., N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., FAQs re: ICD-10, NCTRACKS,
https://www.nctracks.nc.gov/content/public/providers/ICD10/faqs-for-ICD-10.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015) (stating that if providers do not use proper ICD-10 coding, they may
experience delays in payment or even nonpayment).
229. Insel, supra note 222.
230. Am. Psychiatry Ass’n, ICD vs. DSM, 40 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 63 (2009), available
at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2009/10/icd-dsm.aspx.
231. International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Information Sheet, WHO,
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/factsheet/en/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
232. David Goldberg, Comparison Between ICD and DSM Diagnostic Systems for
Mental Disorders, in 21ST CENTURY GLOBAL MENTAL HEALTH 38 (2013), available at
http://samples.jbpub.com/9781449627874/Chapter2.pdf. The ICD-10 classifies nearly 2000
disorders in total. Id. at 39.
233. See generally Michael B. First, Harmonisation of ICD-11 and DSM-V:
Opportunities and Challenges, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 382 (2009).
234. P.K. Dalal & T. Sivakumar, Moving Towards ICD-11 and DSM-V: Concept and
Evolution of Psychiatric Classification, 51 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 310, 314 (2009), available
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systems can and often do result in differing diagnostic results for any given
patient.235 Both the WHO and the APA have worked on the DSM-5 and
the forthcoming ICD-11 with an eye toward greater harmonization, but
given the ubiquitous incongruence,236 the slightly dissimilar goals of the
respective projects,237 and pragmatic concerns,238 comprehensive
harmonization is likely impossible.239
The difference in the approach under the two systems is highlighted by
the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under both systems. DSM-5 is explicit as
to what constitutes a qualifying traumatic event for PTSD, limiting these to
exposure to threatened or actual death, serious injury, or sexual violence.240
Following the event, the patient must experience “intrusion symptoms,”241
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802383. Assen Jablensky notes the
conceptual differences “highlight the provisional nature of many nosological concepts and
their arbitrary definitions.” Assen Jablensky, Towards ICD-11 and DSM-V: Issues Beyond
‘Harmonization,’ 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 379, 380 (2009), available at
http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/195/5/379.long.
235. “These definitional differences go beyond mere appearance; most studies which
have investigated diagnostic concordance by applying both DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria to
the same individuals have found differences in case identification ranging from minor to
significant.” First, supra note 233, at 382.
236. As Michael First states:
Harmonisation of [conceptual] differences is likely to be especially challenging as
it will require that either the DSM-V or ICD-11 work group relinquish its
diagnostic approach in favour of the other group’s approach. On the other hand,
many differences in DSM-IV and ICD-10 definitions are not conceptually based
but instead represent different ways of operationalising the same underlying
diagnostic constructs. Efforts to harmonise these non-conceptually based
differences are comparatively more straightforward.
Id. at 382–83.
237. As Mario Maj states:
In the case of the ICD, the main objective is to improve the public health utility of
the system, and in particular its usability by a range of health professionals. In the
case of the DSM, the main objective, or one of the main objectives, is to make the
clinical characterization of each patient more comprehensive, by adding several
dimensions to the categorical diagnosis.
Mario Maj, Psychiatric Diagnosis: Pros and Cons of Prototypes vs. Operational Criteria,
10 J. WORLD PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 81, 81 (2011).
238. See First, supra note 233, at 382.
239. As Maj continues:
It is almost inevitable that the DSM classification of mental disorders differs from
that of the WHO. The ICD is a comprehensive classification of all . . . diseases
and related health problems for use by a wide range of health professionals in
countries of very varied sizes, cultures, and resources. The APA’s classification is
designed to meet the needs of one, or perhaps two, professions—psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists—in a single country.
Id. at 38 (quoting Robert Kendell, The Relationship Between DSM-IV and ICD-10, 100 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 297, 299–300 (1991)).
240. DSM-5, supra note 213, at 271–80. “Exposure” may be either: direct; witnessing;
indirect (learning that a close family member or close friend was exposed to violent or
accidental trauma); or repeated or extreme indirect exposure to aversive details of the
traumatic event(s), usually in the course of professional duties (for example, first responders
collecting body parts and professionals repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). See id.
241. The patient must experience one of the following: (1) recurrent, involuntary, and
intrusive memories; (2) traumatic nightmares; (3) dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks)
which may occur on a continuum from brief episodes to complete loss of consciousness;
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persistent effortful avoidance of distressing, trauma-related stimuli,242
“negative alterations in cognitions [or] mood,”243 and “alterations in arousal
and reactivity.”244 These symptoms must persist for at least a month.245
Additionally, the patient must also suffer significant symptom-related social
or occupational impairment.246
Though similar, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under ICD-10 differ in
several significant ways. The ICD-10 does not specify what constitutes a
qualifying traumatic event, only requiring that the event be “of
exceptionally threatening or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause
pervasive distress in almost anyone”; it has no criteria as to how long
symptoms must persist; has no functional impairment requirement; and has
no subtypes.247 It is not hard to imagine differing diagnoses with regard to
PTSD depending on which system the psychiatrist applies.
Regardless of the approach, there are considerable problems with the
overarching categorical approach that is common to both the ICD and the
DSM. This approach tends to falsely dichotomize what are likely nondiscrete disease entities, while it underappreciates the individuality of the
patient within each artificially drawn category.248 Moreover, diagnoses are
given purely symptomatically, according to the number of relevant
symptoms that are present or absent as self-reported by the patient and
subjectively interpreted by the physician.249 This method of diagnosis is
unique to psychiatric disorders and brings with it inherent problems.250
(4) intense or prolonged distress after exposure to traumatic reminders; or (5) marked
physiologic reactivity after exposure to trauma-related stimuli. See id.
242. That is, avoidance of either thoughts or feelings of the event, or external reminders
of the event. Id.
243. The patient must experience two of the following (having either begun or worsened
after the event): (1) inability to recall key features of the traumatic event (usually
dissociative amnesia; not due to head injury, alcohol, or drugs); (2) persistent (and often
distorted) negative beliefs and expectations about oneself or the world (e.g., “I am bad,”
“The world is completely dangerous”); (3) persistent distorted blame of self or others for
causing the traumatic event or for resulting consequences; (4) persistent negative traumarelated emotions (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame); (5) markedly diminished interest
in (pretraumatic) significant activities; (6) feeling alienated from others (e.g., detachment or
estrangement); or (7) constricted affect: persistent inability to experience positive emotions.
See id.
244. The patient must experience two of the following (having either begun or worsened
after the event): (1) irritable or aggressive behavior; (2) self-destructive or reckless
behavior; (3) hypervigilance; (4) exaggerated startle response; (5) concentration problems; or
(6) sleep disturbance. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id. The DSM-5 maintains a PTSD subtype with differing criteria for children. Id.
247. WHO, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS:
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH (1992), available at http://www.who.int/classifications
/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdf.
248. See Goldberg et al., supra note 232, at 41–42.
249. See Tadafumi Kato, A Renovation of Psychiatry Is Needed, 10 J. WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 198, 198 (2011).
250. As Kato states:
To further refine psychiatric diagnosis, the only way is to establish a new disease
classification based on the neurobiological features of each mental
disorder . . . . We psychiatrists should be aware that we cannot identify “diseases”
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Furthermore, not everyone views the use of the diagnostic classifications
as dispositive in determining whether an individual suffers from a
psychiatric illness. Instead, some legal experts believe that a clinical
judgment can and should deviate from the classifications in certain
circumstances.251 Under this view, even for those courts that require an
RPI for NIED claims, the classifications are not definitive in the
courtroom.252 At the other extreme, some courts in the United Kingdom
applied the DSM criteria themselves, finding they are competent to do so as
a “common sense application” of the criteria.253 Still another approach is to
create a statutory definition of RPI, drawing from a state-appointed panel of
experts, although this approach was rejected by the English Law
Commission, as “not practicable” and “fraught with difficulty.”254 In the
United States, only a minority of jurisdictions use an RPI as a threshold
requirement.255
Regardless of how evidence of an RPI is used, expert testimony from
mental health professionals engenders the same problem as all claims that
intersect law and science: expert witnesses might present conflicting
diagnoses. As discussed below, this problem is more appropriately dealt
with as a question of admissibility of evidence, including subjecting the
testimony to Daubert tests.
C. Creating Norms
In addition to scientific and medical viewpoints, normative values inform
the definition of emotional harm as well. From this perspective, emotional
harm is a social construct that is intimately tied to setting norms about the

only by interviews. What we are doing now is just like trying to diagnose diabetes
mellitus without measuring blood sugar. Medicine is fundamentally based on
pathology.
Psychiatry should also be based on pathology rather than
psychology . . . . All the technologies we need to refine psychiatry have already
been established. What we should do is to study the neurobiological basis of
mental disorders using updated technologies and give rise to the renovation in
psychiatry.
Id. at 198–99.
251. Mulheron, supra note 198, at 89.
252. See id. at 90.
253. Id. at 92 (citing Calvert v. William Hill Credit Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 454, [134]).
This is despite the APA’s own admonition that “[i]t is important that [the DSM] not be
applied mechanically by untrained individuals.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV xxxii (4th ed. 1994).
254. ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS LC249 ¶¶ 5.2, 5.4
(1998),
available
at
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc249_liability_for_
psychiatric_illness.pdf.
255. See, e.g., Pierce v. Atl. Grp., Inc., 724 S.E.2d 568, 577 (N.C. App. 2012) (quoting
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 395 S.E. 85, 97 (N.C. 1990)
(defining severe emotional distress as “any emotional or mental disorder . . . which may be
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so”); Agnesini v. Doctor’s
Assoc., Inc., 10 CV 9190 (BSJ) (FM), 2012 WL 5873605, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012)
(same); Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 431 (Wash. 1998) (bystander case); Asuncion v.
Columbia Hosp. for Women, 514 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C. 1986) (same); Paz v. Brush
Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 2007) (medical monitoring case).
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appropriate way to respond to an adverse event.256 This is reflected in a
deeper question of subjectivity and agency—the notion that emotional harm
is sometimes in the victim’s control.257 When we tell children not to “make
a mountain out of a molehill,” we are suggesting to them that their response
is at least partially within their control.258 Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky argue that “the much-vaunted fraud objection [in NIED] is in fact
a loose way of expressing the concerns that particular plaintiffs in
emotional distress cases are making mountains out of molehills, and that
permitting a cause of action for pure emotional harm will invite or
encourage citizens to make mountains out of molehills.”259 This reflects
the norm that one should “just get over it,” as well as expresses the ideal
that individuals are responsible for their emotional response.260 Under this
view, a person’s agency is integral to the response of emotional distress.261
Moreover, requiring a showing that the emotional harm is “severe” or
“serious”262 also can imply a normative value that an individual is partially
responsible for her reaction to a situation. Cases awarding damages for
“severe” or “serious” emotional harm could suggest that a plaintiff’s
emotional harm is severe as compared to others;263 or it could demonstrate
256. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1680 (claiming that “[d]on’t make a
mountain out of a molehill” reinforces social norms on appropriate response).
257. Id. at 1676–77 (labeling this as the “agency concern”); see also Goldberg, supra note
87, at 816–17 (arguing for a duty to reasonably regulate one’s own emotional health based
on normative ideals of mental well-being).
258. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1680.
259. Id. at 1680–81. Studies involving the nocebo effect, in which harmless substances
cause harmful effects in patients who receive them, provide an interesting comparison. See
generally Winfried Hauser et al., Nocebo Phenomena in Medicine: Their Relevance in
Everyday Clinical Practice, 109 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT 459 (2012) (including a metaanalysis of all studies mentioning “nocebo effect” in PubMed up to December 2011). These
studies support the view that a patient’s response to a given treatment is affected by the
patient’s expectations. See id. at 461. The response effects can be either psychological or
physiological. See id. at 465.
260. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1681.
261. See id. Reliance on this idea of “agency,” in which the plaintiff’s emotional
response is her responsibility, undercuts the notion that the defendant inflicted harm upon the
plaintiff. Id. at 1685; see Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (describing the assumption in tort law
that a victim of negligence can control his mental anguish, a power he lacks over his bodily
injuries and how this assumption “makes standalone emotional harm unworthy of
compensation”); Keating, supra note 96, at 300 (“Our emotional reactions are mediated by
our minds. Emotional injury may thus be the product—not the negation—of our
agency . . . . We can teach ourselves to toughen up and not be so sensitive, and we can steel
ourselves against even exceedingly unpleasant experiences.”); Goldberg, supra note 87, at
860 (“People have profound abilities to find ways to mitigate their emotional and
psychological despair . . . .”). The normative concept of emotional harm, and the
corresponding duty to regulate one’s own emotional health, raises the issue of comparative
fault: How will we evaluate whether individuals sufficiently avoided—or contributed to—
their emotional harm?
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 46–47 (2012).
263. Id. § 47 cmt. j (requiring that the “harm be serious, [and] that the
circumstances . . . be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious harm”); see
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (defining a serious injury as one “where
a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case”). Whether an injury is serious would
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that the circumstances surrounding the event are particularly extreme.264
Under either view, normative judgments are being made about the extent of
agency and control. A reasonable person could not be expected to control
her response in a situation that is particularly egregious or severe; in that
case, she is a viewed as a victim rather than an agent.265 It is not fair to
expect the individual to exercise agency over her response in those extreme
situations.266
Traditionally, normative values in tort law are reflected in jury decision
making, but in NIED claims, these views of agency and emotional harm
ultimately spill over into limited duty rules. No duty and limited duty rules
in tort law reflect certain assumptions and biases; their main advantage is
the certainty they create in curtailing the claim. The goal in the NIED area
of precluding individual analysis reflects the “universal” nature of mental
harm, naturally occurring while experiencing different life events.267 An
early bias developed that these inevitable stresses of life would create “a
certain toughening of the mental hide [which] is a better protection than the
law could ever be.”268 In addition, instrumentalist concerns come into play:
“Mental injuries . . . are different [from physical ones] because they are not
constrained by time and space proximity and physical laws.”269 This leads
to concerns about imposing liability out of proportion to the negligent act:
“[W]e do not expect society to walk on eggshells fearing that any conduct
that fails to meet an objective standard of proper behavior may result in
significant liability.”270
Categorical thinking, which persists in NIED claims, perpetuates these
normative views. But the compelling nature of those concerns is eroding.
Views of agency, control, and malingering will continue to evolve in the
face of scientific evidence of the physicality of those harms, as well as
evidence of the impact of genetic and environmental factors on reactions to
stressful situations. For example, the diagnosis of PTSD as a genuine claim
has become increasingly accepted in our society.271 Mental illness is

presumably fall more appropriately within the damages consideration. See Goldberg, supra
note 87, at 816 n.25.
264. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1688 (using as an example Portee v. Jaffee,
417 A.2d 521, 521 (N.J. 1980), in which a mother witnessed her five-year-old son die in an
elevator shaft).
265. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1688.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV.
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
269. Rhee, supra note 27, at 841; see Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (“[S]ingling out
physical harms for standalone recovery might shore up the belief that while our bodies are
open to poking and prodding, our minds remain hidden from external
observation . . . . Dualism helps to explain why the tort system scorns victims who suffer
even serious and demonstrable emotional distress. . .”).
270. Rhee, supra note 27, at 852.
271. See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 53, 58–59 (2012).
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becoming destigmatized in various ways.272 As our societal view of
emotional harm changes, this may eventually lead to allowing NIED claims
to proceed like other negligence claims, allowing juries to determine the
reasonable foreseeability that the defendant’s negligent behavior would
cause emotional harm to a direct victim of normal psychological fortitude.
But even before we reach this point—recognizing that the foreseeability test
may not “adequately” address instrumental concerns of curtailing the scope
of liability—courts can still trade some limited duty barriers for increased
jury determination that would reflect changing normative views on
emotional harm. This shift will allow courts to adapt to the rapidly
changing science and medical landscape as well, achieving more validity
and flexibility in evaluating emotional harm.273
IV. REMOVING LIMITED DUTY BARRIERS BASED ON VALIDITY CONCERNS
Categorical duty rules usurp the role of the jury. Traditionally, the role
of the jury is central to American tort law, in particular because we rely on
the jury as members of the public to make factual and normative decisions
on injury, causation, and fault. The most recent Restatement of Torts on
negligence274 contains a renewed emphasis on the centrality of the jury to
negligence determinations for physical injury.275 The Restatement (Third)
rejects the element of foreseeability as part of the court’s evaluation of legal
duty, shifting the question for jury consideration.276 Section 7 of the
272. See Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036,
2038 (2013) (describing increasing acceptance among policymakers and the public that
“illness of the brain must be treated just like illness anywhere else in the body”).
273. Cf. Rhee, supra note 27, at 865–68 (proposing a foreseeability test for direct victims
of mental injury and a graduated test based on culpability for collateral victims and arguing
that the determination of classes of victims will capture the necessary controls for limiting
liability). Rhee argues that the interest of direct victims derives from the right of selfpreservation, while the interest of the collateral victim is the safety or well-being of others,
derivative of the relationship with the primary victim, either through a preexisting
relationship or by a temporal and spatial connection to the accident. Id. at 856.
274. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
(2012).
275. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA.
L. REV. 533, 565 (2013).
276. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7 (2010); id. § 7 cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case,
the appropriate rubric is scope of liability. On the other hand, when liability depends on
factors applicable to categories of actors or patterns of conduct, the appropriate rubric is
duty. No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear,
categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”); id. § 7 cmt. j
(“In order to determine whether appropriate care was exercised, the factfinder must assess
the foreseeable risk . . . . The extent of foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the
case and cannot be usefully assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the facts may
make a dramatic change in how much risk is foreseeable. Thus . . . courts should leave such
determinations to juries unless no reasonable person could differ on the matter.”). This was
a very controversial aspect of the Restatement (Third)’s attempt to constrain judicial power
in negligence. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 (2009) (challenging this approach because
“almost every jurisdiction does treat foreseeability as a significant factor (and frequently the
most significant factor) in analyzing whether the duty element is met in a negligence
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Restatement (Third) states that when an actor’s conduct could create a risk
of physical harm, the actor “ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable
care,”277 and that courts should depart from this general duty only in
“exceptional” cases, when “countervailing principle or policy warrants
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.”278 The use of the
word “exceptional” represents “a renewed commitment to the strong norm
of reasonable care.”279 Further, section 8 emphasizes that the questions of
breach and proximate cause are within the province of the jury rather than
the court.280 The combined effect of these provisions is to restrict the role
of the court in making fact-based duty determinations, squarely assigning
that role to the jury.281 The price of this commitment to increased jury
participation is an expansion of the circumstances under which negligence
suits may get to a jury—it likely will increase the number of suits surviving
dispositive motions and either proceeding to trial or settling in terms more
favorable to the plaintiffs.282
At the same time, the Restatement (Third) does not follow the traditional
balance of power between judge and jury for NIED claims, but instead
assigns the fact-based duty determinations as a matter of law for the
court.283 As discussed above, various policy considerations are cited in
support of this view, but the dominating ones are the need to ensure the
genuineness of the claim,284 to limit liability,285 as well as to eliminate
claims for ordinary stress that is part of modern life.286
We can begin to unpack the concerns captured by NIED limited duty
rules and address them through different judicial mechanisms. Evidence on
genuine validity issues should be addressed by traditional judicial
evidentiary admissibility standards and then sent to the jury for factual
findings. This would serve to reassert the jury’s traditional role with regard
to this claim. Instrumentalist concerns seeking to limit the claim for other
reasons could still be addressed through certain special pleading
requirements or more broadly be shifted to traditional duty and proximate
cause analyses.

claim.”). Some states have begun to adopt this view. See, e.g., Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d
228, 231 (Ariz. 2007); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009); A.W. v.
Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Neb. 2010); Behrendt v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568, 576 (Wis. 2009).
277. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 7(a).
278. Id. § 7(b); see also id. § 7 cmt. a.
279. Porter, supra note 275, at 565–66.
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 8(b).
281. Porter, supra note 275, at 566.
282. Id. at 568.
283. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 47 cmt. g (2012).
284. See id. § 47 cmt. l.
285. See id. § 47 cmt. i.
286. Id. § 47 cmt. l.
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Removing special pleadings requirements on validity issues follows
naturally in the evolution of NIED claims. For example, after courts started
allowing the NIED claim, they adopted the physical manifestation test to
address the concern of fraud.287 Courts gradually began to weaken the
physical manifestation rule or reject it altogether, however, as science,
medicine, and social norms changed and the test became inadequate or
unnecessary. A California case, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,288
proved to be the watershed. In Molien, the California Supreme Court
rejected the physical manifestation test as both overinclusive (permitting
claims with little emotional harm because they manifested physical
consequences) as well as underinclusive (barring claims of serious
emotional harm but no physical manifestation).289 It rejected the claimscreening function of the test and found that the jury, rather than the judge,
should determine the validity of the claim.290 Consequently, plaintiffs did
not need to present evidence of physical manifestation to meet either their
burdens of production or persuasion—the jurors could simply rely on “their
own experience” as well as the defendant’s behavior in evaluating the
claim.291 This represented a major institutional shift to allowing more
claims to be processed by the jury.
Molien prompted other courts to reevaluate the NIED claim and the
physical manifestation requirement.292 As courts began to move away from
the physical manifestation rule, they cited a number of factors in this shift,
including theoretical, scientific, and practical reasons, such as advances in
science, a shift to a general foreseeability analysis, notions of fairness, and
reliance on stronger evidentiary requirements. Some courts were driven by
their interpretation of scientific understanding of emotional harm.293 Other
courts relied more heavily on common sense and equitable concerns.294

287. Physical manifestation could include a heart attack or an ulcer. See JOHN L.
DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 10.01[B][2] (4th ed. 2010). The physical
manifestation of emotional harm is a prerequisite and does not measure the extent of the
mental injury. See Diamond, supra note 29, at 146–47.
288. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
289. Id. at 820.
290. Id. at 821.
291. Id.
292. See Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202–03 (Alaska 1995) (discussing how
physical manifestation might not be sufficient for jury to decide whether emotional injury is
foreseeable and sufficiently “severe” or “serious,” even in the absence of accompanying
physical injury or diagnosable illness, at least in cases where a preexisting duty is present);
Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608–09 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that the “zone of
danger” test does not apply to direct victims and allowing NIED claim regarding alleged
malpractice of psychologist, despite lack of physical manifestation of emotional injury); Folz
v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 259 (N.M. 1990) (allowing a cause of action in absence of physical
injury and noting the “illogic of requiring as a threshold element the presence of physical
injury to manifest the emotional trauma”).
293. See Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 608–09 (describing scientific view of emotional
responses to stress to determine emotional harm); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw.
1974) (using reasonable foreseeability test but relying on medical proof to determine harm).
294. See Montinieri v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978)
(appealing to logic; rejecting physical manifestation and impact tests).
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Gradually, use of the physical manifestation test was cut back, but it was
replaced with other limited duty barriers.
One reason that these barriers persist is that, although the notion that
fraud could lead to excessive and fictitious NIED lawsuits is consistently
challenged,295 it has never been abandoned; most courts have maintained
limited duty barriers to address these fraud concerns. In particular, the
Restatement (Third) does not require “physical manifestation,” but it still
requires a showing of “serious” emotional harm. The “seriousness”
requirement acts as a screen to demonstrate the genuineness of the claim:
“[t]he requirements that the harm be serious, that the circumstances of the
case be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious harm, and that
there be credible evidence that the plaintiff has suffered such harm better
serve the purpose of screening claims than a requirement of physical
consequences.”296 The seriousness requirement is designed to eliminate
claims for everyday stress that is common in modern society as well as
ensure that the claims are genuine.297
Molien teaches us, however, that it is appropriate to reexamine limited or
no-duty tests for the NIED claim when those tests are not serving their
intended purpose. Although the ability of neuroscience to predict
psychological states remains controversial,298 advances in neuroscience will
continue to challenge the traditional emotional harm doctrines designed to
validate and measure emotional harm.299 Even if we are not at the point at
which we can use neuroscience to establish definitively individual
emotional harm, we are getting substantially closer to that point. These
advances will influence, in turn, medical and normative definitions of
emotional harm. As this occurs, limited duty rules, which serve as rough
proxies for the genuineness and severity of harm suffered, need to be
reexamined. In particular, the traditional but historically weak limited duty
rules of physical manifestation of emotional injury and the zone of impact
tests (the latest iteration found in the Restatement (Third)) are further
weakened as indicators of the validity and severity of distress.300 These
barriers to emotional harm claims are now ripe for modification and
dissolution.
To aid in this endeavor, this Article proposes that any limited duty test
should address only nonvalidity concerns. Duty barriers based on
assumptions about failure of proof should be removed, and the question of
295. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1678–79. Professors Goldberg and
Zipursky argue that the fraud objection to general recovery for NIED is “unpersuasive for
several reasons”: (1) most of the reported cases involve situations in which there is little
doubt that some emotional harm exists; (2) the concern whether the events unfolded in the
way alleged by plaintiff is not unique to NIED; and (3) that the claim is based on a
subjective mental state is not an obstacle in other areas. Id.
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 47 cmt. j (2012).
297. Id. § 47 cmt. l.
298. Cassin, supra note 118, at 960; Helen S. Mayberg, Neuroimaging and Psychiatry:
The Long Road from Bench to Bedside, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S31, S34 (2014).
299. Cassin, supra note 118, at 960.
300. Id. at 960–61.
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validity should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Questions about the
state of scientific and medical knowledge should be worked out through a
Daubert hearing. This would allow individualized analysis of the harm
itself. If courts choose to maintain limited duty rules aimed at curtailing the
claim for instrumentalist reasons, the limited duty rules should be
reconstituted to address categories of claims, not the nature of an individual
claim. Alternatively, courts could go further and remove limited duty
barriers in the NIED claim completely and rely upon traditional negligence
duty and proximate cause tests as a way to curtail the number of claims.301
Under this proposal, the Restatement (Third) requirement of a “serious”
emotional harm would no longer be part of the duty analysis. Instead, the
seriousness of the harm would be a question for the fact-finder to
determine. Similarly, other special pleading tests courts use in the duty
analysis as a substitute for validity screening would no longer be used, such
as a physical contact or impact test, requiring a diagnosable psychiatric
illness or physical symptomology. Instead, duty barriers only would be
used to address instrumental concerns of curtailing indeterminate liability.
A type of limiting test to serve this purpose could be a zone of danger test,
but one that includes either physical or emotional harm, or a relationship
test based on reasonable expectations of the parties. Limited duty tests such
as these may be used to prevent disproportional liability.302
Although relying on the artificial and arbitrary barriers developed by the
courts no longer makes sense to address questions about the genuineness of
the claim,303 strictly applying the DSM-5 or ICD-10 may not be supportable
as well, since some but not all cases will be susceptible to medical
diagnosis. Even if they are susceptible, conflicting diagnoses may occur.304
301. Cf. Keating, supra note 96, at 291 (emotional harm in preexisting relationship cases
should be viewed as proximate cause, not duty, cases).
302. The idea of focusing solely on instrumentalist concerns borrows from the limited
duty tests developed in the area of economic loss for financial advice. Most states follow the
Restatement (Second) approach, which allows claims to proceed depending on the closeness
of the relationship between the claimant and the defendant, an indication of “justifiable
reliance.” See Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368 (Mass. 1998)
(applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts test to a claim for negligent misrepresentation).
The purpose of the test is to limit the number of claims to which the defendant (frequently an
auditor or accountant) is exposed; the amount or validity of the claim is tested through
traditional means of duty and causation analysis. See Jay M. Feinman, Liability of
Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
17, 29–30, 41–48 (2003).
303. See Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (“As an experience of the body rather than mind,
emotional harm is qualitatively the same as physical illness or injury. . . . It differs from
[physical injury and illness] only in terms of evidence.”); see also Kolber, supra note 120, at
834 (predicting that brain imaging technology may relieve legal limitations in tort law on
recovery for stand-alone emotional harm claim); Emily F. Suski, Dark Sarcasm in the
Classroom: The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional Harm As
Unconstitutional, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV 125, 144–45 (2014) (arguing that courts should
evaluate emotional harm in the same way as physical harm in cases of constitutional
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment for severe harm imposed by school officials).
304. See supra notes 240–47 and accompanying text. Although I suggested in earlier
writings that courts should dispense with heightened pleading requirements in determining
the validity of NIED claims, except perhaps requiring medical diagnosis of a psychiatric
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Instead, all evidence on validity—including and perhaps especially
neuroscience evidence—should be screened through traditional evidentiary
tests, including Daubert screening if necessary.305 Expert opinion could be
used to demonstrate that the claimant’s injury is real, even if the injury does
not rise to the level of a recognized psychiatric illness. Allowing evidence
on validity to proceed in this fashion should allow more flexibility to
consider state-of-the-art scientific advances that occur in neuroscience.
Although the plaintiff must still prove that he or she suffered actual
damages, if successful, the plaintiff would recover for the full extent of the
psychological harm, regardless of whether the full extent was foreseeable.
In other words, the traditional “eggshell” plaintiff rule (we take our victims
as we find them) would continue to apply.
Under this formulation, a claimant can rely on expert testimony to show a
diagnosed psychiatric injury, and also rely on other traditional evidentiary
methods to prove the mental harm, including physical symptoms,
neuroscientific tests, treatment, hospitalization, fact witnesses, or a
combination of these factors.306 The jury will weigh this evidence for factinjury, see Grey, supra note 18, at 224, recent developments in this dynamic area have
caused me to shift my views. First, because neuroscience is a rapidly developing field,
particularly in this area, it has become clear that evidence on validity should be addressed
through evidentiary means rather than categorical thinking. In addition, the controversies
surrounding the DSM-5, as well as the increasing reliance on the ICD-10, also suggest that a
medical diagnosis of psychiatric injury should be subject to traditional evidentiary standards,
rather than used as a heightened pleading requirement.
305. With advances in technology proceeding rapidly, the technology’s admission as
evidence has become increasingly common. See Jones et al., supra note 196, at 5.
Neuroimaging has been admitted in criminal cases to support a range of issues. See, e.g.,
McNamara v. Borg, 923 F.2d 862, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (mitigating factor from
schizophrenia); United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2010 WL 339084, at *6 (N.D. Ind.
Jan. 21, 2010) (incompetency to stand trial due to dementia); People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 98
(Cal. 2000) (mitigating factor due to obsessive-compulsive disorder); People v. Holt, 937
P.2d 213, 229–33 (Cal. 1997) (mitigation factor from brain abnormality); People v.
Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 722–23 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (non-responsibility because of a brain
defect); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 232 (Tenn. 2000) (lack of competency to be executed).
Similarly, in civil cases, neuroimaging has been admitted in a variety of contexts. See Boyd
v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (head
injuries); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064–65 (N.D. Ill.
2005) (video game–caused aggression); Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d
811, 814–17 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (physical manifestation of PTSD); Fini v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. 227592, 2003 WL 1861025, at *2–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (head
injuries); Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co., No. 215512, 2000 WL 33421451,
at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000) (incompetency to contract).
306. Similarly, defendants will be able to dispute the claim using a range of evidence.
For example, numerous psychological tests have been developed to detect an individual’s
malingering psychiatric injury or illness, with varying levels of success. See, e.g., Jascha
Rüsseler et al., The Effect of Coaching on the Simulated Malingering of Memory
Impairment, 8 BMC NEUROLOGY 37, 37 (2008) (successfully using response times in shortterm memory test to predict malingering, but method susceptible to coached patients);
Fredric E. Rose et al., A Comparison of Four Tests of Malingering and the Effects of
Coaching, 13 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 349, 358 (1998) (Portland Digit
Recognition Test-Computerized correctly identified 70 percent of coached patients). It is
particularly easy to malinger PTSD because diagnosis relies largely on the patient’s
subjective self-reporting of their symptoms, although tests have been developed to determine
malingering in those patients. See Khodabakhsh Ahmadi et al., Malingering and PTSD:
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finding. We are at the point at which the jury can adequately distinguish
fraudulent and frivolous claims from legitimate ones—at least as much as
for other tort claims—without having to set up artificial and arbitrary
barriers to do the job for them.307 This approach will allow judges and
juries to take “invisible” harm as seriously as more visible physical harm.
Courts can control jury decision making through traditional means: using
jury instructions to correct cultural prejudices; using dispositive motions
and directed verdicts if no reasonable jury could find injury; and using
remittitur or ordering a new trial if the jury’s damages awards seem
excessive. Furthermore, trivial claims would receive trivial damages, the
same recognition that trivial physical claims receive.308
In that way, it reasserts corrective justice concerns that have been
downplayed or absent from the NIED claim. From a corrective justice (and
civil recourse) point of view, individuals should have access to the courts
for harm resulting from another’s civil wrong. For over a century, we have
limited that access. As the dissent stated in Daniel Ware’s case, in arguing
to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for a
trial:
For Daniel to be left without a remedy under all the undisputed facts in
this case is antithetical to the general policy of tort liability in AngloAmerican jurisprudence: those who are legitimately injured due to the act
or omissions of others should have a remedy in our courts.309

As the recognition of emotional harm evolves, so too should the tort.
Yet, we cannot ignore the instrumentalist concerns that surround this
claim. While fraud and frivolous lawsuits can be addressed through
evidence and procedure, those same mechanisms may not work to control
potentially unlimited liability, and as noted above, may need to be
addressed through limited duty rules.310
Exposure to liability depends both on the severity of harm suffered by an
individual victim and the number of injured victims.311 Tort law
traditionally addresses the severity of harm through the eggshell plaintiff
Detecting Malingering and War Related PTSD by M-FAST, 13 BMC PSYCHIATRY 154, 154
(2013) (Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test).
307. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 832–35 (noting that the vast amount of insurance fraud
involves claims for property damage, physical injury, and economic loss; that pain and
suffering for whiplash or other soft tissue injuries, which are no more difficult to fake than
mental harm, have been widely accepted historically; that courthouses are replete with
marginal cases, filed for various purposes including settlement and harassment, but that
courts have learned how to separate out fraudulent from legitimate claims; also enumerating
other disincentives to bring fraudulent claims).
308. Mulheron, supra note 198, at 99 n.165. Handford and Mullany argue that if minor
physical injury is recognizable, a comparatively minor emotional harm should be recognized
as well, distinguishing the ranking of the claim through a smaller award. See HANDFORD &
MULLANY, supra note 208, at 82–85.
309. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop., 180 P.3d 610, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
310. Although this concern traces directly back to the distributive justice idea that
physical harm is more important than mere emotional harm, and could be challenged on that
basis, I do not address that question here.
311. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 837.
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rule, even for claims it tries to limit through duty rules, like NIED.
Limitations of recoverable damages typically occur through other
governmental mechanisms, such as a limit on statutory damages, which
imposes such value judgment through the legislative process.312
The core problem that should be addressed by limited duty rules involves
the aggregate number of claims that could potentially be brought. Although
tort law traditionally addresses this concern through the three major
elements of a tort suit—duty, causation, and proximate cause—the common
law of NIED has addressed the problem largely by limiting duty through a
series of artificial and arbitrary barriers. This is effective in limiting
exposure to a more specific number of plaintiffs, but it has proven to be too
much protection; the barriers are no longer—if they ever were—
theoretically supportable. The practical effect of the proposal advanced in
this Article may well be that the number of plaintiffs who could potentially
recover will be enlarged, as a trade-off for the institutional advantage of
allowing jurors, rather than judges, to decide the validity of claims in this
area as well the theoretical advantage of opening the door further to
corrective justice.
Traditionally, physical harm is distinguished from mental harm in one
significant aspect from a legal standpoint—physical injuries are
circumscribed by time and space and the laws of physics. In other words,
when a negligent driver strikes a victim, the physical injuries that result can
be more readily anticipated. But the view that “invisible” emotional
injuries that may result may not be as limited by the laws of physics and
therefore less predictable313 is beginning to change in the face of scientific
312. See, e.g., 13 GEORGIA JURISPURDENCE PERSONAL INJURY & TORTS § 11:66 (1995)
(placing a $250,000 statutory cap on punitive damages in the absence of an allegation and
finding of specific intent to cause harm); Carol A. Crocca, Validity, Construction, and
Application of State Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical
Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245 (1995) (numerous states impose limits on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits); see also, e.g., 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST
STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 6:13 (2014) (showing numerous states have statutory
damage caps on suits brought against governmental agencies); Tim Snider, COPYRIGHT:
Statutory
Damages—Limit
on
Punitive
Damages
Award,
LAWLETTER,
http://www.nlrg.com/public-law-legal-research/bid/86884/COPYRIGHT-StatutoryDamages-Limit-on-Punitive-Damages-Award (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (explaining that a
single instance of copyright infringement can be awarded no less than $750 and no more
than $30,000, unless the infringement was willful in which case up to $150,000 can be
awarded). Courts also have imposed limits on damages, particularly in the punitive damages
area. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579–83 (1996) (suggesting a
10:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages to meet constitutional concerns).
Neuroscience advances will challenge the misconception that individuals experience pain
similarly. Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM.
J.L. & MED. 433, 437–38 (2007). Acknowledging these differences may lead courts
examining NIED torts to focus more on the defendant’s negligent conduct and less on how a
“normal” or “reasonable” person would react to the experience. This would more closely
align to recognition of physical and property damage. Id. Or, even if courts resist this route
to allow more subjectivity into the NIED analysis, then neuroscience may eventually help us
to define the normative question of acceptable social behavior by empirically demonstrating
average reactions to stress. Grey, supra note 18, at 228.
313. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 841.
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advances suggesting the physicality of those harms. A related issue is that
reactions may be delayed.314 As such, this proposal may open the door to
more cancerphobia claims. In particular, if the claim is based on the
“special relationship” between a company and its workers who have been
exposed to a toxin, it is likely that more claims will reach the jury. But this
is not a new problem. For example, toxic exposure cases, such as asbestos
and diethylstilbestrol (DES), have presented a similar knot, and courts have
developed ways to handle large numbers of claims that may take a long
time to manifest (such as through a proximate cause analysis).315
Another way to address the instrumentalist concerns of limiting frivolous
and trivial lawsuits could be through pleadings requirements on damages.
Although traditionally plaintiffs do not need to plead a specific amount of
damages in their complaint, a state could statutorily require allegation of a
certain level of damages. This would allow courts to strike the pleadings
under a motion to dismiss analysis316 for complaints that only include
nominal damages, which would serve to inhibit trivial claims.317
This proposal may be criticized on the basis that it simply shifts the
limited duty barriers to address other areas and does not eliminate them
altogether. On one level, this criticism is apt—the test only removes the
barriers for validity questions. On another level, however, it focuses more
sharply the purpose of the barriers, and more properly resurrects the role of
the jury in this area.
The proposal also could be criticized for allowing too many claims to go
to the jury and not effectively curtailing the defendant’s exposure to
liability. True, it may very well allow more plaintiffs to be eligible for
recovery. But, more importantly, it allows compensation for deserving
victims and thus more fully satisfies the corrective justice theory of tort law.
At the same time, it more effectively deters undesirable behavior by
allowing more social behavior to be reached by the common law claim.318
314. See, e.g., NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. MENTAL HEALTH, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER: THE MANAGEMENT OF PTSD IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN IN PRIMARY AND
SECONDARY CARE § 2.1.3 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/
PMH0015848/pdf/TOC.pdf (noting that in some cases PTSD symptoms may not set in for
years after the traumatic event).
315. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1462–64 (10th Cir. 1988)
(applying proximate cause analysis to manage asbestos cases); Tracey I. Batt, DES ThirdGeneration Liability: A Proximate Cause, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217, 1250–51 (1996)
(claiming that traditional notions of proximate cause are sufficient to fairly handle DES
cases).
316. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
317. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 345–46 (2010) (describing
use of nominal damages). Or if trivial claims go forward, the degree of injury could be
recognized by giving a lower level of damages to acknowledge the weaker claim. See supra
note 309 and accompanying text.
318. It also could be argued that allowing a broader-based negligence action would
eviscerate the claim of IIED, since there would be no incentive to plead the intentional tort.
See Crump, supra note 37, at 454–55. But that dichotomy is true of other broad-based
negligence as opposed to intentional torts. As with other intentional torts, plaintiffs would
have the availability of punitive damages, which can create a strong incentive for plaintiffs
to seek recourse under the intentional tort. Further, if the tort occurs in the workplace,
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CONCLUSION
For over a century, courts have struggled to accommodate conflicting
views of emotional harm stemming from negligence. These struggles have
not been distinguished by their logical consistency or their persuasive
analysis. But one thing has remained constant: courts have exercised their
power to shape the contours of recovery for emotional harm and have
consistently shielded defendants from liability based on an array of
justifications that stem from distrust of the claim to faulty science to fear of
open-ended liability. As we attempt to move beyond this rigid conception
of emotional harm, the law’s respect for a defendant’s rights should be
matched by an enforceable respect for a plaintiff’s rights.
The evolving notions of our views on emotional harm—from scientific,
medical, and normative perspectives—make this an appropriate time for
courts to reconsider these longstanding practices. Difficulties of proof of
harm should not deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to try to convince
the trier of fact of the truth of his or her claim. We can test the validity of
the claim of emotional harm the way we address it for other negligencebased torts; the fears about the genuineness of the claim may be dispelled
with fundamental common law principles in negligence, procedure, and
evidence. Common law courts should trust these principles.

pursuing the negligence tort may be precluded by workers’ compensation schemes, whereas
the intentional tort may not be precluded.

